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NOTES

NEW WINE IN OLD WINESKINS: ANALYZING
STATE DIRECT-SHIPMENT LAWS IN THE
CONTEXT OF FEDERALISM, THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE, AND THE
TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT
Jason E. Prince*
And no one pours new wine into old wineskins. If he does, the new
wine will burst the skins, the wine will run out and the wineskins will
be ruined.
Luke 5:37-381
INTRODUCTION

According to wine historian Thomas Pinney, the title of "greatest
patron of wine and winegrowing that this country has yet had" belongs
to an unlikely candidate: Thomas Jefferson. 2 Although Jefferson's
role as one of America's founding oenophiles3 receives relatively little
*

Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2005; M.Phil., University

of Cambridge, 2000; A.B., Davidson College, 1999. I would like to thank Professor
Patricia L. Bellia for providing invaluable suggestions and encouragement, and the
members of the NotreDame Law Review for their hard work on this Note. Most of all, I
wish to thank my parents, Larry andJulie, my sister, Stephanie, my grandparents, Bob
and Barbara, and my best friend, Ruth, for their constant love, support, friendship,
and guidance.
1 Luke 5:37-38. In Jesus' day, " [b]ott l es ... were made of skin. When new wine
was put into [the wineskin] it fermented and gave off gas. If the bottle was new, there
was a certain elasticity in the skin and it gave with the pressure; but if it was old, the
skin was dry and hard and it would burst." WILLIAM BARCLAY, THE DAILY STUDY BIBLE
SERIES: THE GOSPEL OF LUKE 67-68 (rev. ed. 1975).
2

THOMAS PINNEY, A HISTORY OF WINE IN AMERICA 129 (1989).

3 Oenophile is defined as "a lover or connoisseur of wine." WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1565 (3d ed. 1986). In considering the constitution1563
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notoriety, his exploits in the field of viticulture are well documented. 4
During his time as Minister Plenipotentiary to France, 5 Jefferson extensively toured the French and German wine countries, 6 taking detailed notes on the "infinite number of painstaking steps required to
produce a wine of the first quality." 7 He shipped samples of his favorite French wines across the Atlantic so that such friends as George
Washington and John Jay "might decide just what they would like him
to get for them in the future."8 In one shipment, Jefferson sent his
brother-in-law seventy-two bottles of "what is the very best Bordeaux
wine." 9 Moreover, while back in Virginia, he imported not only European wines, but also those from vineyards in Kentucky, Maryland, and
North Carolina.' 0 Declaring that "[n]o nation is drunken where wine
is cheap," I Jefferson apparently believed the beverage should flow as
12
freely in commerce as it did at his dinner table.
Yet according to some states' modern direct-shipment laws, Jefferson's passion for exporting and importing fine wine would merit him
a less distinguished title: "third-degree felon." Florida, for example,
criminalizes the direct shipment of alcoholic beverages from out-ofstate manufacturers to unlicensed in-state residents and elevates repeat offenses to a third-degree felony. 13 All parties who "conspire" to
violate Florida's direct-shipment laws (such as consumers who place
ality of direct-shipment laws, several courts have described the plaintiffs-primarily
wine consumers who want to import out-of-state wine directly to their homes-as "oenophiles." See, e.g., Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 520 n.2 (6th Cir. 2003); Dickerson
v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2003); Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 509 (4th
Cir. 2003); Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 849 (7th Cir. 2000).
4 See E.M. HALLIDAY, UNDERSTANDING THOMAS JEFFERSON 72-73 (2001); MARIE
KIMBALL, JEFFERSON: THE SCENE OF EUROPE 1784 TO 1789, at 197 (1950).
5 Jefferson began his service as Minister Plenipotentiary in 1784 and was officially relieved of his duties in 1789. KIMBALL, supra note 4, at 3, 308.
6 PINNEY, supra note 2, at 127.
7 KIMBALL, supra note 4, at 197.
8 DuMAS; MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 234-35 (1951).
9 HALLIDAY, supra note 4, at 80.
10 PINNEY, supra note 2, at 127-28.
11 AJEFFERSON PROFILE 301-02 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1956) ("I rejoice .. . at the
prospect of a reduction of the duties on wine, by our national legislature. . . . No
nation is drunken where wine is cheap ....
Its extended use will carry health and
comfort to a much enlarged circle.") (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
12 Jefferson once described his daily wine consumption as follows: "I double ...
the Doctor's glass and a half of wine, and even treble it with a friend .... " FRANCIS W.
HiRST, LIFE AND LEITERS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 521 (1926). Moreover, during his first
term as President, Jefferson spent $2400 on wine each year-an expenditure that constituted nearly ten percent of his annual salary. See NORMAN K. RiSjoRD, THOMAS JEFFERSON 130 (1994).
13 See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 561.54(1), 561.545(3) (West 2003).
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orders for out-of-state wine shipments) are guilty of the same degree
of crime as the out-of-state shipper.' 4 Thus, when a wine connoisseur
in Florida orders a bottle of chardonnay from California over the In6
ternet, he risks a $5000 fine 15 and up to five years behind bars.'
Over the past five years, modern-day oenophiles have launched a
bevy of constitutional challenges to direct-shipment laws. Consumers
and wine producers 17 contend that these laws violate the dormant
Commerce Clause's general prohibition against protectionist state legislation.1 8 States and wine wholesalers 19 counter that the Twenty-First
Amendment expressly prohibits the "transportation or importation
[of alcohol] into any State ...in violation of the laws thereof. 20 The

debate over how to resolve the inherent contradictions between the
dormant Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment revolves
around one issue: the extent of state power to regulate liquor
commerce.
Analyzing direct-shipment laws in the context of federalism, the
dormant Commerce Clause, and the Twenty-First Amendment, this
Note argues that the Supreme Court should uphold the states' power
to discriminate against out-of-state wine shipments. Part I highlights
federalism's role in the historical development of the dormant Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment. This historical overview demonstrates a cyclical pattern in which Congress and the states
repeatedly attempted to vest regulatory control over liquor commerce
in the states, yet time after time the Supreme Court used the dormant
Commerce Clause to undermine this policy objective. In other words,
the Court engaged in judicial activism, or 'judges disallowing as unconstitutional policy choices made in the ordinary political process
that the Constitution does not clearly disallow-'clearly' because in a
democracy the judgment of elected representatives should prevail in
21
cases of doubt."
14 See id. § 562.23.
15 See id. § 775.083(1)(c) (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
16 See id. § 775.082(3)(d).
17 See Susan Lorde Martin, Wine Wars-Direct Shipment of Wine: The Twenty-First
Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and Consumers'Rights, 38 AM. Bus. LJ. 1, 5-10 (2000)
(providing an extensive discussion of the various interest groups involved in the direct-shipment debate).
18 See infra Part I.B.
19 See Martin, supra note 17, at 5-6 (naming wholesalers as a main proponent of
strong state alcohol regulatory power under the Twenty-First Amendment).
20 U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI, § 2.
21 Lino A. Graglia, The Myth of a Conservative Supreme Court: The October 2000 Term,
26 HAR. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 281, 282 (2003).
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Part II explores the major post-1933 Supreme Court cases in
which the Twenty-First Amendment and the dormant Commerce
Clause have come into conflict. Originally, the Court respected the
states' sweeping regulatory powers under the Twenty-First Amendment. In 1984, however, the Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias2 2 Court rees-

tablished the dormant Commerce Clause as a device through which
the judiciary can trump Congress and the states' shared policy preference pertaining to liquor regulation. Part III provides an overview of
state direct-shipment statutes and explores how six circuit courts' postBacchus attempts to address such laws have further eroded state regulatory power over wine.
Part IV considers direct-shipment laws in light of Supreme Court
debate over thejudiciary's role in (1) enforcing the principle of federalism; (2) guarding against state protectionism via the dormant Commerce Clause; and (3) applying the Twenty-First Amendment. While
the current majority supports invoking federalism to uphold states'
rights, 23 a strong minority urges allowing the political process to deter-

mine the appropriate federal-state balance. 24 The Twenty-First
Amendment constitutes a rare example of Congress and the states
shifting the equilibrium of federalism in favor of state power. Thus,
paradoxically, both sides of the federalism debate can and should cite
their respective jurisprudence in overruling Bacchus and upholding
state direct-shipment laws. Similarly, the dormant Commerce Clause's
advocates and opponents alike should respect Congress and the
states' mutual desire to grant the states broad power over liquor commerce. Otherwise, the doctrine will devolve from an exercise of judicial intervention into a vehicle forjudicial activism, and the Twenty-First
Amendment will be reduced to virtual irrelevance.
The biblical proverb about "new wine in old wineskins" 25 serves as
a helpful metaphor for this Note's central arguments. Initially, the
Supreme Court respected Congress's and the states' policy preference
and granted the states broad Twenty-First Amendment power over li22 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
23 As discussed in Part IV, other commentators predict that the Rehnquist Court
will uphold direct-shipment laws on states' rights grounds. See Martin, supra note 17,
at 22-23; Gordon Eng, Note, Old Whine in a New Battle: PragmaticApproaches to Balancing the Twenty-First Amendment, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Direct Shipping of
Wine, 30 FoRD AM UR3. L.J. 1849, 1915-16 (2003); Eric L. Martin, Note, A Toast to the
Dignity of States: What Eleventh Amendment JurisprudencePortends for Direct Shipment of
Wine, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1303, 1305, 1342, 1344 (2003). Rather than focus solely on
the Rehnquist Court's purported emphasis on states' rights, this Note investigates di-

rect-shipment laws in the context of the Court's broader federalism jurisprudence.
24 See infra Part IV.A.
25 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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quor regulation. However, in Bacchus, the Supreme Court resorted to
judicial activism by stitching together two constitutional "wineskins":
the dormant Commerce Clause (roughly 180 years old), and the
Twenty-First Amendment (over seventy years old). The principle of
federalism-itself nearly 215 years old-weaves its way through both
of these wineskins, serving as the container's uniting thread. Subsequently, the courts have expanded this container in ways the TwentyFirst Amendment's ratifiers hardly could have foreseen. While the
amendment has steadily ossified, the dormant Commerce Clause has
exhibited surprising suppleness. "Pouring" the direct-shipment law
debate into the Court's current three-piece patchwork threatens to
further rupture not only the Twenty-First Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause, but also the container's federalist seams.
I.

OLD WINESKINS:

A

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF FEDERALISM,

THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE, AND

THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT

A.

Federalism

Although the doctrine of federalism does not expressly appear in
the Constitution's text, it has long served as one of the document's
animating principles. The U.S. federalist system divides governance
between two sets of sovereigns: (1) the national government, which
possesses "limited" powers, and (2) state governments, which enjoy
"reserved" powers. 26 James Madison, "the Father of the Constitution,"
did not seek to create "a consolidation of the States into one simple
republic." 27 Rather, he sought to establish a delicate balance in which
"[t] he powers delegated . . .to the federal government, are few and

defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments, are
numerous and indefinite." 28 Regardless, the Framers' various postPhiladelphia musings fall short of providing a definitive model for the
Constitution's division of power between the federal and state
governments.
To fill this theoretical void, political scientists have developed two
competing models of federalism: dual federalism and cooperative federalism. 29 Dual federalism envisions "two mutually exclusive recipro26 See KATHLEEN
ed. 2001).
27
28

M.

SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

83 (14th

2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 338 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).
THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 241 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James

McClellan eds., 2001).
29 STATES' RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM
Nelson eds., 1999) [hereinafter STATES' RIGHTS].

XX

(Frederick D. Drake & Lynn R.
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cally limiting fields of power-that of the national government and
that of the States. The two authorities confront each other as equals
across a precise constitutional line, defining their respective jurisdictions." 30 Cooperative federalism, on the other hand, espouses the
view that "the supremacy clause and the necessary and proper clause
of the Constitution grant power to the national government, even if
the actions of the national government touch state functions." 31 This
model "views the state and national governments as partners, but the
3 2
national government sets policy for the nation."
Despite the theoretical uncertainties surrounding federalism, the
Supreme Court invokes the principle to resolve conflicts between
Congress and state governments. This mediation most often consists
of "protecting the states against invasions by national institutions, ...
protecting states from incursions by their neighbors, and . . . restraining states from transgression on core national/constitutional values." 33 Although significant disagreement exists within the current
Supreme Court over whether judges or politicians should serve as fed34
eralism's gatekeepers,
nearly all agree-as the Supreme Court has emphasized-that federalism serves important values. First, in comparison with the national government, state and local governments are closer to the
people and more capable of reflecting local needs, values, and mores. Second, the diversity of state and local governments permits
experiment and competition ....
Third, apart from its capacity to
promote government that delivers goods and services effectively,
federalism fosters connection and community ....
Finally, state and
35
local governments function as counterweights to national power.
B.

Dormant Commerce Clause

The dormant Commerce Clause forbids states from unduly burdening interstate commerce. 3 6 This doctrine lacks express textual
support in the Constitution; rather, it constitutes a negative inference
30

Alpheus Thomas Mason, Federalism: The Role of the Court, in FEDERALISM: INFI24-25 (Valerie Earle ed., 1968).
31 See STATES' RIGHTS, supra note 29, at xx.
32 Id.
33 William N. Eskridge, Jr. &John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause:A Political
Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1359 (1994).
34 See infra Part IV.
35 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative"Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 440-41 (2002).
36 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 401 (2d ed. 2002).
NITE VARIETY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 8,
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drawn from the Commerce Clause. 37 When Congress legislates pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, it can preempt state and local
laws. 38 Yet even if Congress refrains from exercising its commerce

power in a particular area, the federal courts can strike down state and
local laws for burdening interstate commerce.3 9 The dormant Commerce Clause enables federal courts to guard Congress's commerce
40
power against state protectionism.
As the states discovered under the Articles of Confederation, extreme state protectionism (1) "is inconsistent with the very idea of political union"; 41 (2) "cause[s] resentment and invite[s] protectionist
retaliation";4 2 and (3) "diverts business away from presumptively lowcost producers without any colorable justification in terms of a federally cognizable benefit." 43 Indeed, when the Framers converged in
Philadelphia for the Constitutional
Convention, remedying the ills of
"economic Balkanization" 44 presided at the top of their agenda. 4 5
The dormant Commerce Clause's jurisprudential roots stretch at
least as far back as the 1824 Supreme Court decision of Gibbons v.
Ogden.4 6 Chief Justice Marshall attributed "great force" 47 to the argument that Congress's power to regulate commerce "implies in its nature, full power over the thing to be regulated, [and] it excludes
necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the same operation on the same thing."48 Gradually, this concept of Congress's ex-

37 See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 26, at 234.
38 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2. This provision is commonly referred to as the
Supremacy Clause.
39 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 401.
40 See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY &
WAITE 18 (1937) ("(T]he doctrine [is] that the commerce clause, by its own force and
without national legislation, puts it into the power of the Court to place limits upon
state authority.").

41 Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1113 (1986).
42 Id. at 1114.
43 Id. at 1119.
44 The term "economic Balkanization" was obviously not part of the Framers' dialogue. However, in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), the Supreme Court
employed the term to describe the country's economy under the Articles of Confederation. Id. at 325.
45 CHEMERINSKV, supra note 36, at 403.
46 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
47 Id. at 209.
48 Id.
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clusive power to regulate interstate commerce became firmly
49
embedded in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.
Although the Supreme Court has upheld the dormant Commerce Clause for roughly 150 years, its legitimacy remains a subject of
debate. Much of this disagreement boils down to federalism and the
Court's role in enforcing it. On the one hand, Professor Donald Regan argues that the Framers primarily created the Commerce Clause
"not to empower Congress, but rather to disable the states from regulating commerce among themselves." 50

Given that state regulations

on interstate commerce "are individually too petty, too diversified and
too local to get the attention of a Congress hard pressed with more
urgent matters,"51 the federal courts must guard against economic
Balkanization on Congress's behalf. This approach prevents state protectionism by appointing federal courts as gatekeepers, which seek to
maintain Congress's exclusive power over interstate commerce.
Professors Martin H. Redish and Shane V. Nugent counter that
the dormant Commerce Clause spawns judicial activism and "undermines the carefully structured federal balance embodied in the [Constitution's] text."'5 2 They assert that the Framers intended Congress to
guard against economic Balkanization without the dormant Commerce Clause's assistance. The Framers "establishe[d] the intertia in
favor of the exercise of state power, because the states do not need to
overcome any federal barrier before they enact economic legislation." 53 Unless Congress utilizes the Commerce Clause to preempt
state law, they argue, the states can seek creative and localized ways to
advance their respective economic interests. 5 4 The dormant Com49 Five years after Gibbons, in Willson v. Black Bird Creek, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245
(1829), Chief Justice Marshall went one step closer to enshrining the dormant Commerce Clause by stating that the challenged state law could not "be considered as
repugnant to the [federal] power to regulate commerce in its dormant state, or as
being in conflict with any law passed on the subject." Id. at 252 (emphasis added).
Following the 1851 decision of Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299
(1851), the dormant Commerce Clause became a fixture of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. Id. at 319 (holding that certain categories of interstate commerce are
national by nature and require exclusive legislation by Congress); see also Martin H.
Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the ConstitutionalBalance
of Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569, 577 (asserting that it was not until Cooley "that the
[dormant Commerce Clause] became firmly established in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence").
50 Regan, supra note 41, at 1125.
51 Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
52 See Redish & Nugent, supra note 49, at 569, 573.
53 Id. at 592.
54 See id.
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merce Clause, however, removes Congress's oversight power to the
courts, thus "shift[ing] the political inertia against the states in the
regulation of interstate commerce, and leav[ing] federal oversight of
state regulation in the hands of the government body traditionally
55
thought to be least responsive to state concerns."
Despite the misgivings of Professors Redish and Nugent, the dormant Commerce Clause remains a fixture of modern Supreme Court
jurisprudence. The Court has in recent years adopted a two-step approach to applying the doctrine. First, if a state law facially discriminates against out-of-state commerce, or if it is facially neutral yet has a
discriminatory purpose or effect, the Court Will apply a strict scrutiny
test. 56 As Justice Kennedy stated in C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown, this test provides that "[d]iscrimination against interstate
commerce in favor of local business is per se invalid, save in a narrow
class of cases in which the [state] can demonstrate, under rigorous
scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local interest."5 7 Thus far, the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence contains few cases in which a facially discriminatory law has
' 58
survived this "rigorous scrutiny.

Second, if a state law is nondiscriminatory, but nevertheless bur-

59
dens interstate commerce, the Court will resort to the balancing test
established in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 60 Under this test, the Court

considers "the nature of the local interest involved, and ...whether it
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities." 6 1 The Court will strike down a nondiscriminatory law only if the
"burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in rela55 Id. at 617; see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 33, at 1367 ("[T]he Court
will be more prone to strike down state or local, rather than national, regulation on
grounds of federalism. This is so in part because the Court is more likely to diverge
ideologically from any given state legislature than it is from Congress ....
.
56

See

SULLIVAN

&

GUNTHER,

supra note 26, at 245.

57 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994); see also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571-95 (1997) (striking down a tax scheme that primarily
benefited in-state charitable organizations as facially discriminatory); Or. Waste Sys.,
Inc. v. Or. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98-108 (1994) (deeming facially discriminatory a differential fee for the disposal of out-of-state solid waste).
58 See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137-52 (1986) (holding that a Maine
law banning the importation of out-of-state live baitfish was nevertheless constitutional because the state had no other way to protect its uniquely pristine waters from
such baitfish's parasites).
59

See

60

397 U.S. 137 (1970).

61

Id. at 142.

SULLLIVAN

&

GUNTHER,

supra note 26, at 245.
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tion to the putative local benefits." 62 Both the strict scrutiny and balancing tests require the Court to probe the policy justifications
underlying state laws in order to determine if a state has unconstitutionally usurped Congress's commerce power.
The doctrine set forth in C&A Carbone and Pike does not enjoy
the unqualified support of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and
Justice Thomas. These three Justices primarily object to the doctrine
because it has no textual basis and enables judicial activism in an
arena best left to Congress. For example, Justice Thomas urged the
abandonment of the doctrine because it is an "exercise of judicial
power in an area for which there is no textual basis." 63 Similarly, Justice Scalia asserted that the balancing test for facially neutral laws "is
more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular
rock is heavy . . . [and is] ill suited to the judicial function. '6 4 Chief
Justice Rehnquist expressed alarm over the dormant Commerce
Clause's impact on federalism, criticizing the Court's "messianic insistence on a grim sink-or-swim policy of laissez-faire economics ... [as]
a policy which bodes ill for the values of federalism which have long
'6 5
animated our constitutional jurisprudence.
62 Id.; see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470-74
(1981) (rejecting a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a state law that banned
the retail sale of plastic nonreturnable containers but permitted the retail sale of nonplastic nonreturnable containers-a major in-state product); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 125-29 (1978) (upholding as nondiscriminatory a state law
prohibiting producers or refiners of petroleum from operating retail service stations).
63 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 612
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia has also disapproved of the dormant
Commerce Clause's lack of textual basis, stating that the "'negative Commerce
Clause' . . . is 'negative' not only because it negates state regulation of commerce, but
also because it does not appear in the Constitution." Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson
Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64 Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Ultimately, Justice Scalia begrudgingly accepts the dormant Commerce
Clause, but merely because the "vast number of negative-Commerce Clause cases
[have] engender[ed] considerable reliance interests." West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 209 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Moreover, he only supports
using the doctrine in two situations: "(1) against a state law that facially discriminates
against interstate commerce, and (2) against a state law that is indistinguishable from
a type of law previously held unconstitutional by this Court." Id.
65 West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 217 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see alsoJenna
Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path". A Theory of
JudicialEnforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1490 (1995) (positing a theory of federalism in which "the Court should not fetishize the free national market
and should approach the [dormant Commerce Clause] cases with a more lenient eye
toward state and local police and developmental policies"); Frank B. Cross, Realism
About Federalism,74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1304, 1325 (1999) (suggesting that the "meaning-
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Even if these three dissenting Justices are wrong, and the Framers
did intend a dormant Commerce Clause, Congress can still override
dormant Commerce Clause rulings. Professor William Cohen asserts
that "over a century of Supreme Court decisions establish beyond debate Conress's power to consent to state laws that, absent congressional consent, would be invalid as unreasonable burdens on
interstate commerce. "66 Indeed, as early as 1891, the Court ruled that
Congress had the power to "divest" certain commercial articles of
their interstate character.6 7 Over fifty years later, the Court reconfirmed that Congress possesses the "undoubted power to ... permit

the states to regulate commerce in a manner which would otherwise
not be permissible." 68 This concept of Congress's ability to carve out
exceptions to the dormant Commerce Clause played a crucial role in
the history of U.S. liquor regulation. 69 Moreover, it underscores Part
IV's discussion of federalism, the dormant Commerce Clause, and direct-shipment laws.
C.

Twenty-First Amendment

Early in the nation's history, the states enjoyed virtually unfettered authority over alcohol regulation.7 0 Beginning with the License
Cases,71 the Court held that state police power permitted local liquor
regulations, regardless of the Commerce Clause's negative relessness of federalism" is partly due to the fact that "the dormant Commerce Clause is
a commonly invoked constitutional constraint on state action that may be selectively
used for ideological ends").
66 William Cohen, CongressionalPower to Validate UnconstitutionalState Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REv. 387, 387 (1983).
67 See In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 562 (1891); inf'a note 84 and accompanying text.
68 S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945). As recently as
1982, the Court has restated its obligation to set aside the dormant Commerce Clause
in the face of Congressional action:
[W]e only engage in [dormant Commerce Clause] review when Congress
has not acted or purported to act. Once Congress acts, courts are not free to
review state taxes or other regulations under the dormant Commerce
Clause. When Congress has struck a balance it deems appropriate, the
courts are no longer needed to prevent states from burdening commerce
.... Courts are final arbiters under the Commerce Clause only when Congress has not acted.
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1982) (citations omitted).
69 See infra Part I.C.
70 See Sidney J. Spaeth, Comment, The Twenty-First Amendment and State Control
Over Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CAL. L. REV. 161, 165
(1991).
71 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
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straints. 72 In Mugler v. Kansas,73 for example, the Court upheld a state
law banning the production and sale of liquor.74 The Mugler Court
expressly recognized that once a state legislature established its preferred method of regulating alcohol, "it is not for the courts, upon
their views as to what is best and safest for the community, to disre'75
gard the legislative determination on that question.
However, a mere year after Mugler, the Court backtracked on its
traditional recognition of broad state police power over alcohol. Invoking the dormant Commerce Clause, the Court held in Bowman v.
Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. 76 that a state's right to regulate liquor under its police power "arises only after the act of transportation
has terminated. '7 7 Shortly thereafter, in Leisy v. Hardin,78 the Court
went a step further by holding that imported alcohol constituted an
article in interstate commerce so long as it remained inside its original
package. 79 Accordingly, enterprising individuals could circumvent
their state's temperance laws by importing alcohol and then reselling
it to in-state consumers-they merely needed to refrain from removing the liquor's out-of-state packaging.
Recognizing the "original package" rule's absurd impact on local
temperance goals, Congress rushed to the states' defense. Within
four months of Leisy, Congress passed the Wilson Act, 80 which provided that states could regulate imported alcohol "upon arrival" in the
same way they regulated locally produced alcohol. 8 1 Moreover, the
Act expressly overruled the Court's "original package" rule. 82 According to the Act's sponsor, SenatorJames Wilson of Iowa, the Act sought
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
§ 121
81

See id. at 579.
123 U.S. 623 (1887).
Id. at 662.
Id.
125 U.S. 465 (1888).
Id. at 499.
135 U.S. 100 (1890).
Id. at 124-25.
Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (codified as amended at 27 U.S.C.
(2000)).
See id. The Act reads in relevant part:

All .

.

. intoxicating liquors ...

transported into any State or Territory...

shall upon arrival in such State or Territory be subject to the operation and
effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its
police powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as though such
liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory, and shall
not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original
packages or otherwise.
27 U.S.C. § 121 (2000).
82 See id.
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to "leave every State in the Union free to determine for itself what its
policy shall be in respect of the traffic in intoxicating liquors."8 3
The In re Rahrer Court upheld the Wilson Act, acknowledging
that Congress could "provide that certain designated subjects of interstate commerce shall be governed by a rule which divests them of that
character."8 4 Professors Noel T. Dowling and F. Morse Hubbard explain this concept of "divesting" as follows: "Congress has power
under the commerce clause . . . to divest intoxicating liquor of its

interstate character-to strip it of that something which gives it immunity from the operation of state laws-and the liquor, after being thus
divested, is subject to state laws. '8 5 By "divesting" alcohol of its interstate nature "upon arrival" in each state, the Wilson Act granted the
states broader regulatory power over liquor importations.
However, the Supreme Court soon allowed alcohol importers to
exploit yet another loophole in state temperance regimes: direct mail
order shipments from out-of-state producers to in-state consumers. In
Rhodes v. Iowa,8 6 the Court interpreted the Wilson Act's "upon arrival"
provision to mean that state liquor laws could not constitutionally apply until the alcohol shipments "arrive [ed] at the point of destination
and [were] deliver[ed] there to the consignee."8 7 Although Iowa argued that the Act "operate [d] to attach the legislation of the State of
88
Iowa to the goods in question the moment they reached the state line,"

the Court disagreed. Consequently, states could not regulate alcohol
until it reached the homes of consumers, and "[in] ail order booze, of
course, flourished."8 9 Yet again, the Court used the dormant Commerce Clause to undermine Congress's efforts to enable state alcohol
regulation.
Eventually, temperance advocates convinced Congress to close
the direct-shipment loophole and fully divest imported alcohol of its
interstate character. The Webb-Kenyon Act, officially entitled "An Act
divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate character in certain
cases," 90 provided that "[t]he shipment or transportation [into a
state] ... of any ...

liquor... [which] is intended... to be received,

83 21 CONG. REc. 4954 (1890) (statement of Sen. Wilson).
84 In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 562 (1891) (emphasis added).
85 Noel T. Dowling & F. Morse Hubbard, Divesting an Article of Its Interstate Character: The Doctrine Underlying the Webb-Kenyon Act, 5 MINN. L. REV. 100, 101 (1921).
86 170 U.S. 412 (1898).
87 Id. at 426.
88 Id. at 420 (emphasis added).
89 Spaeth, supra note 70, at 173.
90 Webb-Kenyon Act, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (codified as amended at 27
U.S.C. § 122 (2000)).
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possessed, sold, or in any manner used . ..in violation of any law of
such State . . .is prohibited." 9 1 Avoiding use of the phrase "upon

arrival," the Webb-Kenyon Act revoked the Court's ability to apply the
92
dormant Commerce Clause to state alcohol regulations.
Although President Taft vetoed the Act as an unconstitutional
delegation of Congress's exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce, 93 Congress overrode his veto. 94 Subsequently, in Clark Distilling Co. v. West Maryland Railway Co.,9 5 the Court recognized that the
Webb-Kenyon Act "did not simply forbid the introduction of liquor
into a State for a prohibited use, but took the protection of interstate
commerce away. "96 The Court did not distinguish between discriminatory and nondiscriminatory state laws; rather, it recognized that
Congress placed state liquor laws outside the dormant Commerce
9
Clause's ambit.

7

Unfortunately for states' rights advocates, the Webb-Kenyon Act
emboldened temperance proponents at the federal level. 9 8 In 1919,
the Eighteenth Amendment ushered in the temperance era's highwater mark-nationwide prohibition of liquor. 99 This amendment simultaneously constituted the lowest ebb of state power over alcohol
regulation. Although the amendment granted Congress and the
states "concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation," it had the practical effect of making "a seemingly invincible
states' rights movement toward local regulation of alcohol simply
evaporate[ ] in the face of federal regulation."10 0 The flaws of this
"one-size-fits-all alcohol regulatory regime" 10 ' soon became evident.
Government corruption and gangster bootlegging ran rampant, leading President Harding eventually to admit that federal regulation of
liquor had devolved into "nationwide scandal."' 0 2 This deep disdain
for the federal government's handling of Prohibition not only hastened the Eighteenth Amendment's demise, but also fueled a desire
91
92

Id.
See id.

93

See 49 CONG.Rlc. 4291 (1913).

94
95
96
97
98

27 U.S.C. § 122 (2000).
242 U.S. 311 (1917).
Id. at 325.
See id. at 324.
See Spaeth, supra note 70, at 174-75.
99 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
100 Spaeth, supra note 70, at 175.
101 Matthew J. Patterson, Note, A Brewing Debate: Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws and
the Twenty-First Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 761, 769.
102 LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE BuREAu OF PROHIBITION 46 (1929).
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among "Congress and.., the states to insist on state control of liquor
upon repeal." 1 3
Fourteen years after its inception, national prohibition ended
with the enactment of the Twenty-First Amendment. 10 4 Section 1 of
the Twenty-First Amendment expressly repeals the Eighteenth
Amendment,1 0 5 and Section 3 sets a seven year time limit on ratification. 10 6 The most crucial provision is Section 2, which declares that
" [t] he transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."'1 7 Notably, neither Congress nor the federal government receives any mention. Unlike the Eighteenth Amendment's provision of
"concurrent" 10 8 authority between Congress and the states, Section 2
seems to vest power in the states alone.
Regardless, the history leading up to the Twenty-First Amendment indicates its primary purpose was to shield state liquor regulations from the dormant Commerce Clause. Support for this
interpretation derives from the remarkable parity between the language of Section 2 and the Webb-Kenyon Act. 10 9 While the WebbKenyon Act statutorily divested alcohol of its interstate character, the
Twenty-First Amendment went a step further by enshrining this sweeping state power in the Constitution's text. 10 In other words, Congress
saw a Constitutional amendment as the only way to "insulate ...state
control from either congressional second-thoughts about the WebbKenyon Act or a hostile Supreme Court decision striking down the
Act."] 11

Nevertheless, some commentators proffer a narrower reading of
the amendment's plain language. For example, Professor Lawrence
H. Tribe asserts that the amendment's "text actually forbids the private conduct it identifies, rather than conferring power on the States
103

Spaeth, supra note 70, at 180.
U.S. CONST. amend XXI.
105 Id. § 1.
106 Id. § 3.
107 Id. § 2.
108 U.S. CONST. amend XVIII, § 2.
109 See supra text accompanying note 91.
110 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205-06 (1976) ("The wording of § 2 of the
Twenty-first Amendment closely follows the Webb-Kenyon and Wilson Acts, expressing the framers' clear intention of constitutionalizing the Commerce Clause framework established under those statutes.").
111 Brannon P. Denning, Smokey and the Bandit in Cyberspace: The Dormant Commerce
Clause, the Twenty-First Amendment, and State Regulation of Internet Alcohol Sales, 19
104

CONST. COMMENT.

297, 304 (2002).
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as such."'112 Admittedly, if divorced completely from its historical context, Section 2 could be given such a reading. History, however,
makes the correctness of this interpretation unlikely. Roughly twenty
years before the Twenty-First Amendment's ratification, the Supreme
Court interpreted the Webb-Kenyon Act's language as having completely divested liquor of its interstate character. 113 Accordingly, the
amendment's drafters likely believed that their use of remarkably similar language would effectively elevate liquor's divested character to
constitutional status. Indeed, Professor Tribe himself acknowledges
that the amendment's "evident objective" was to "empower the States,
notwithstanding the inhibitions of the Dormant Commerce Clause, to
bar transporting or importing intoxicants for local delivery or
1 14
consumption."
Although plain text and general history make the Twenty-First
Amendment's meaning sufficiently clear, the amendment's ratification history also augments a broad interpretation. At first glance, the
legislative history underlying the amendment appears ambiguous.
Upon closer inspection, however, the legislative history of Senate Joint
Resolution 211' 15-the resolution that gave rise to the amendmentsupports a sweeping states' rights interpretation. Indeed, the TwentyFirst Amendment's sponsor, Senator John J. Blaine, explained that
"[w] hen our government was organized and the Constitution of the
United States was adopted, the States surrendered control over and
regulation of interstate commerce. This proposal is restoring to the
states.., the right to regulate commerce respecting a single commodity-namely, intoxicating liquor."1 16 Similarly, in his floor statement,
Senator William E. Borah of Idaho provided an overview of the previous cases in which the Supreme Court used the dormant Commerce
Clause to frustrate Congress's efforts to empower state liquor regulation via federal statute. 117 Wanting to ensure "States rights, the right
of the people of the respective States to adopt and enjoy their own

112

Lawrence H. Tribe, How to Violate the Constitution Without Really Trying: Lessons

from the Repeal of Prohibitionto the Balanced Budget Amendment, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 217,
219 (1995).
113 See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
114 See Tribe, supra note 112, at 218. As discussed in Part II.A, Justice Brandeiswhose interpretive vision was not obscured by the passage of over a half-century-had
no trouble gleaning this "evident objective" from the amendment's plain text.

115

SJ. Res. 211, 72d Cong., 76

116

76 CONG. REc. 4141 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine).

117

See id. at 4170-71 (statement of Sen. Borah).

CONG. REC. 4138 (1933).
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policies," Senator Borah demanded constitutional protection of the
1 18
states' regulatory power.
However, other remarks made during the floor debates suggest
that Section 2 only sought to protect states that wanted to remain dry
after Prohibition's repeal. 119 For example, Senator Blaine commented that Section 2 was included "to assure the so-called dry States
against the importation of intoxicating liquor into those States."'120
Similarly, Senator Borah expressed concerns about the post-Prohibition plight of dry states. I 21 Yet proponents of this narrow reading
overlook the fact that the broader interpretation of Section 2 includes
the narrower interpretation. In other words, a constitutional regime
in which states have sweeping power to discriminate against out-ofstate liquor is also a regime in which dry states have sweeping power to
remain dry. Thus, Senators Blaine and Borah could simultaneously
endorse both positions. Conversely, if they had intended to advocate
solely for a narrow interpretation of Section 2, they would not have
concurrently espoused a broad states' rights interpretation.
Moreover, the Senate's rejection of a proposed third section provides additional support for a broad reading of the amendment's language. This controversial provision would have granted the federal
government "concurrent" power "to regulate or prohibit the sale of
intoxicating liquor to be drunk on the premises where sold." 1 22 Ac-

cording to Justice Black, who participated in the floor debates as a
Senator from Alabama,123

[i]t is clear that the opposition to Section 3 and its elimination from
the proposed Amendment rested on the fear, often voiced during
118 See id. at 4172 (statement of Sen. Borah).
119 See Duncan Baird Douglass, Note, Constitutional Crossroads: Reconciling the
Twenty-First Amendment and the Commerce Clause to Evaluate State Regulation of Interstate
Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages, 49 DuKE L.J. 1619, 1634 (2000) (arguing that the Senate floor debates on Section 2 "suggest[ ] that the provision was understood simply as
protection for dry states"); cf Clayton L. Silvernail, Comment, Smoke, Mirrorsand Myopia: How the States Are Able to Pass UnconstitutionalLaws Against the Direct Shipping of Wine
in Interstate Commerce, 44 S.TEX. L. REv. 499, 545 (2003) (asserting that Section 2's
.obscure legislative history is no help in ascertaining its true meaning," but nevertheless claiming the provision only sought to provide states the option of remaining dry).
120 76 CONG. REc. 4141 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine).
121 See id. at 4170-71 (statement of Sen. Borah) (expressing concerns that, without Section 2, "we are asking dry States to rely upon the Congress... to maintain
indefinitely the Webb-Kenyon law").
122 S.J. Res. 211, 72d Cong., 76 CONG. REc. 4138 (1933).
123 See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 353 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that Justice Black served in the Senate during the Twenty-First Amendment's ratification).
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the Senate debate, that any grant of power to the Federal government.., could be used to whittle away the exclusive control over
liquor traffic given the States by Section 2."124
Those who discredit the amendment's ratification history as ambiguous overlook evidence of an equally important part of the constitutional amendment process: state ratification. 12 5 Unfortunately, the
states did not provide definitive statements indicating the reasoning
behind their ratification of the amendment. 126 Yet, their actions following ratification speak louder than any express declaration. Indeed, states immediately utilized their Twenty-First Amendment
powers to enact "'bold and drastic experiments in price control,' including price posting, regulation by private associations, and
mandatory resale price maintenance contracts. " 127 Notably, such regulatory actions were taken by states that did not remain dry following
Prohibition. In other words, these states ratified the Twenty-First
Amendment with the understanding that it constituted a sweeping
grant of states' rights, not a narrowly tailored protection for dry states.
Plain text and history combine to suggest that Congress and the
states enacted the Twenty-First Amendment in an effort to fundamentally shift the traditional federalist balance of liquor regulation in the
states' favor. As the Supreme Court repeatedly asserted, Congress can
empower the states to regulate interstate commerce in ways that
would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce Clause. 128 Following
the nation's dismal experience under Prohibition, Congress conceded
that effective liquor control required local support and local solutions. 129 Accordingly, Congress proposed the Twenty-First Amendment as a "liquor regulation" exception to the dormant Commerce
124 Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 337 (1964)
(Black, J., dissenting).
125 Indeed, under Article V of the Constitution, the states possess greater power to
amend the Constitution than Congress. First, Congress cannot single-handedly ratify
constitutional amendments; rather, it can only propose amendments, which threefourths of the states must then ratify. See U.S. CONST. art. V. Second, even if Congress
initially refused to propose amendments, the legislatures of two-thirds of the states
can force Congress to "call a Convention for proposing Amendments." Id.
126 See Spaeth, supra note 70, at 181.
127 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. at 357 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Joz de
Ganahl, Trade Practice and Price Control in the Alcoholic Beverage Industry, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 665, 680 (1940)).
128 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
129 Cf New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
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Clause. The states ratified Congress's proposal and immediately enacted sweeping laws under their newfound authority.
II.

STITCHING TOGETHER THE SUPREME COURT'S

JURISPRUDENTIAL PATCHWORK

Given the Court's pre-1933 eagerness to strike down state alcohol
laws on dormant Commerce Clause grounds, alcohol producers immediately claimed that the post-1933 liquor regulations unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce. This Part charts such
dormant Commerce Clause suits through to the Supreme Court's
130
most recent rulings at the time of writing.
Starting with its 1936 decision in State Board of Equalization v.
Young's Market Co.,' 3 1 the Court did not strike down a discriminatory
state liquor law on dormant Commerce Clause grounds for nearly a
half-century. However, the 1984 case of Bacchus constituted a resurgence in judicial activism via the dormant Commerce Clause. The
Court yet again negated Congress's and the states' joint effort to establish a federal balance in which the dormant Commerce Clause does
not apply to state liquor regulations.
A.

Sweeping State Power. 1936-1984

1. Justice Brandeis and Plain Language: The Young's Market Line
of Cases
Initially, the Supreme Court held that the Twenty-First Amendment granted states sweeping powers over alcohol importations. In
Young's Market, the Court considered a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge to state alcohol regulations for the first time since Prohibition's collapse. 13 2 A group of California wholesalers wished to import
130 Most of the previous scholarly works on state direct-shipment laws include extensive discussion of various Twenty-First Amendment cases that do not involve the
dormant Commerce Clause. Admittedly, this method has its merits. The Court peppered its landmark decision of Bacchus--a case dealing exclusively with the dormant
Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment-with dicta from Twenty-First
Amendment cases that had nothing to do with the dormant Commerce Clause. Accordingly, analysis of the Court's overall Twenty-First Amendment jurisprudence can
prove helpful in putting the dormant Commerce Clause cases in context. At the same
time, however, this broad approach risks diluting the dormant Commerce Clause's
unique role as the driving force behind the Twenty-First Amendment's ratification.
This Note focuses almost exclusively on cases that consider both the Twenty-First
Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause.
131 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
132 See id. at 59.
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beer from Missouri and Wisconsin; in order to do so, however, they
had to pay a $500 importation license fee. 133 Given that domestic
beer producers did not have to purchase this $500 license to ship
their products within the state, the importers claimed that California's
mandatory importation license violated the dormant Commerce
Clause. 134 The wholesalers urged the Court to construe the amendment to mean that "[t] he state may prohibit the importation of intoxicating liquors provided it prohibits the manufacture and sale within
its borders; but if it permits such manufacture and sale, it must let
135
imported liquors compete with the domestic on equal terms."
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Brandeis bluntly rejected
the wholesalers' argument. He asserted that their interpretation
"would involve not a construction of the amendment, but a rewriting
of it." 1 3 6 Because the amendment's plain language "confered upon

the state the power to forbid all importations which do not comply
with the conditions which it prescribes,'

3

7

the Court refused to con-

sider the wholesalers' argument that the amendment's history suggested a narrow interpretation. 13 8 Moreover, the unanimous Court
dismissed the wholesalers' secondary argument that "a state may not
regulate importations except for the purpose of protecting the public
health, safety, or morals; and that the importer's license fee was not
imposed to that end."' 3 9 Justice Brandeis countered the wholesalers'
claim with a rhetorical question: "If [a state] may permit the domestic
133 Id. at 60-61.
134 Id. at 61. Interestingly, Justice Brandeis ruled that California's licensing
scheme did not "present a question of discrimination prohibited by the commerce
clause." Id. at 62. Rather, he regarded the importation fee as raising constitutional
concerns because it imposed "a direct burden on interstate commerce." Id. Although Justice Brandeis refrained from treating the state licensing laws as discriminatory, it is difficult to view them in any other way. To bring out-of-state beer into
California, importers had to pay an extra $500-a payment not required to obtain
domestically produced beer. Similarly, the Hawaiian law considered in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,468 U.S. 263 (1984), placed a twenty percent excise tax on imported
liquor but exempted certain domestic alcohol. See id. at 265. The Bacchus Court
deemed Hawaii's tax scheme facially discriminatory. Id. at 268. Thus, although the
Court's characterization of the challenged laws in Young's Market and Bacchus may
have differed, both legal regimes had the same discriminatory impact on foreign liquor. Regardless, Justice Brandeis suggested in dicta that the Twenty-First Amendment protected even discriminatory state liquor regulations. See infra note 140 and
accompanying text.
135 Young's Market, 299 U.S. at 62.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 See id.
139 Id. at 63.
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manufacture of beer and exclude all made without the state, may it
not, instead of absolute exclusion, subject the foreign article to a
heavy importation fee?'

1 40

In other words, Justice Brandeis viewed

the amendment as granting states not only the power to exclude foreign liquor, but also the power to discriminate against foreign
liquor.

14 1

Three years later, the Court upheld Young's Market in Indianapolis

143
Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Commission 142 and Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves.

Justice Brandeis again wrote the majority opinion in Indianapolis Brewing, which upheld a Michigan law that prohibited in-state liquor retailers from selling beer produced in states that discriminated against
Michigan-produced beer. 144 Basing its ruling on Young's Market, the
Court reasoned that "[s]ince the Twenty-first Amendment . . . the

right of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating
14 5
liquor is not limited by the commerce clause."'
The Ziffrin case involved a Kentucky law that sought to "channelize the traffic [of alcohol], minimize the commonly attendant evils
[and] also to facilitate the collection of revenue." 14 6 Upholding the
law, the Court found Kentucky's liquor regulation regime "clearly appropriate." 147 The Court not only reaffirmed the states' sweeping
Twenty-First Amendment power to inhibit alcohol commerce, but also
sanctioned the states' ability to "adopt measures reasonably appropriate to effectuate these inhibitions and exercise full police authority in
respect of them."'148 Thus, the trilogy of Young's Market, Indianapolis
Brewing, and Ziffrin stands for the proposition that the Twenty-First

140 Id. Notably, laws that "subject the foreign article to a heavy importation fee"
are the same as the Hawaiian importation tax that was challenged-and overturnedin Bacchus. See infra Part II.B.
141 Two years later, Justice Brandeis again wrote for a unanimous Court in upholding a Minnesota statute that "clearly discriminate[d] in favor of liquor processed
within the State as against liquor completely processed elsewhere." Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 403 (1938). Although Mahoney involved the Equal
Protection Clause, id. at'402, and not the dormant Commerce Clause, it confirmed
that the Twenty-First Amendment empowered states to discriminate against out-ofstate liquor.
142 305 U.S. 391 (1939).
143 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
144 IndianapolisBrewing, 305 U.S. at 392, 394.
145 Id. at 394.
146 Ziffrin, 308 U.S. at 134.
147 Id. at 139.
148 Id. at 138.
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Amendment empowers states to enact even "blatantly discriminatory
49
statutes."1
2.

A Glimpse of Things to Come: Duckworth and Carter

The Young's Market line of cases seemed to suggest that the
Twenty-First Amendment constituted the states' primary source of
power over the transportation and importation of liquor. However,
the 1940s witnessed a reversion to the Court's pre-1888 preference for
upholding state alcohol regulations as a valid exercise of police
power.1

50

52
151
In both Duckworth v. Arkansas and Carter v. Virginia,'

the Court considered challenges to laws requiring people to secure
permits before transporting alcohol through a state. Because the liquor was not intended for "delivery or use" within the state, the Court
in both cases reasoned that the Twenty-First Amendment did not apply.' 5 3 Both decisions nevertheless upheld the state permit requirements because they fell within the states' police powers. 154 Yet, in
both cases, the Court reserved the power to strike down such state
police power regulations if they extended beyond "reasonable"
55
bounds.'
In Duckworth, Justice Jackson warned in a concurring opinion that
"[i]f the Twenty-first Amendment is not to be resorted to for the decision of liquor cases, it is on its way to becoming another 'almost for149 Spaeth, supra note 70, at 183.
150 See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
151 314 U.S. 390 (1941).
152 321 U.S. 131 (1944).
153 See id. at 135 (stating that because "the intoxicating liquors in question are
intended for continuous shipment through [the state] ...a different question arises
from those considered under the Twenty-First Amendment, where transportation or
importation into a state for delivery or use therein was prohibited"); Duckworth, 314
U.S. at 392 (asserting that "[w]e have no occasion to decide whether the Arkansas
statute, when applied to transportation passing through that state for delivery or use
in another, derives support from the Twenty-first Amendment").
154 See Carter,321 U.S. at 135 ("The commerce power of Congress [was] not invaded by such police regulations as Virginia has here enforced."); Duckworth, 314 U.S.
at 394 ("While the commerce clause has been interpreted as reserving to Congress
the power to regulate interstate commerce in matters of national importance, that has
never been deemed to exclude the states from regulating matters primarily of local
concern . .

").

155 See Carter, 321 U.S. at 134 (noting the appellants' assertion that state police
powers are "limited by the Commerce Clause to regulations reasonably necessary to
enforce its liquor laws"); Duckworth, 314 U.S. at 396 (providing that state police power
regulations on alcohol do not violate the Commerce Clause so long as they are "reasonably necessary to protect the local public interest in preventing unlawful distribution or use of liquor within the state").
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gotten' clause of the Constitution. " 156 Rather than rely on state police
power over liquor, Justice Jackson argued that the majority should
have upheld the state permit requirements because the Twenty-First
Amendment "obviously gives to state law a much greater control over
interstate liquor traffic than over commerce in any other commodity."'1 5 7 By relying instead on reasonable state police power, Justice
Jackson asserted, the majority ignored the Twenty-First Amendment's
very purpose:
The people of the United States knew that liquor is a lawlessness
unto itself.... They did not leave it to the courts to devise special

distortions of the general rules as to interstate commerce to curb
liquor's "tendency to get out of legal bounds." It was their unsatisfactory experience with that method that resulted in giving liquor
an exclusive place in constitutional law as a commodity whose trans58
portation is governed by a special constitutional provision.1
Justices Black and Frankfurter echoed Justice Jackson's concerns
in concurring opinions in Carter. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Black (who served in the Senate during the debates surrounding the
Twenty-First Amendment)15 9 stated that he was "not sure that statutes
regulating intoxicating liquor should ever be invalidated by this Court
under the Commerce Clause except where they conflict with valid federal statutes." 60 Relying on Young's Market, IndianapolisBrerwing, and
Ziffrin, Justice Black concluded that "local, not national, regulation of
61
the liquor traffic is now the general Constitutional policy.'
Similarly, Justice Frankfurter asserted that questions about state
power over alcohol regulation were "peculiarly political, that is legislative, questions which were not meant by the Twenty-first Amendment
to continue to be the fruitful apple of judicial discord, as they were
156 Duckworth, 314 U.S. at 399 (Jackson, J., concurring).
157 Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
158 Id. at 398-99 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter pursued a strikingly similar line of reasoning in Carter:
It is now suggested that a State must keep within "the limits of reasonable
necessity" and that this Court must judge whether or not [the state] has
adopted "regulations reasonably necessary to enforce its local liquor laws."
Such canons of adjudication open wide the door of conflict and confusion
which have in the past characterized the liquor controversies in this Court
and in no small measure formed part of the unedifying history which lead
first to the Eighteenth and then to the Twenty-first Amendment.
Carter, 321 U.S. at 142 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
159 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
160 Carter,321 U.S. at 138 (Black, J., concurring).
161 Id. (Black, J., concurring).
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before the Twenty-first Amendment."' 6 2 Because the amendment
provided a "general Constitutional policy" in favor of local regulation,
the three concurring Justices wisely urged deference to the states' policy judgments.
Conversely, both the Duckworth and Carter Courts "brushe [d]
aside the liquor provisions of the Twenty-first Amendment"1 63 in favor
of their own case law regarding state police power. Unlike Leisy and
Rhodes, 164 in which the Court used the dormant Commerce Clause to
displace state temperance regulations, these decisions did not instantly abridge state power over liquor. Nevertheless, just like their
nineteenth century predecessors, these cases made state liquor regulations the "fruitful apple of judicial discord" 65 and created the likeli166
hood of a reversion to judicial intervention.
Throughout the roughly forty years following Duckworth and
Carter,the Court never questioned the states' power to enact discrimi162 Id. at 142 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
163 Duckworth, 314 U.S. at 399 (Jackson, J., concurring).
164 See supra Part I.C.
165 Carter, 321 U.S. at 142; see text accompanying note 158. Placing Duckworth and
Carterin broader historical context sheds additional light on the Court's eagerness to
recognize broad state police powers over liquor. In 1937, a mere four years before
Duckworth, the Court overturned Lochnerv. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish,300 U.S. 379 (1937). During Lochner's thirty-two year reign, the Court
struck down roughly two hundred state laws as violating the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 592. The West Coast Hotel Court,
on the other hand, "unequivocally declared ... that government could regulate to
serve any legitimate purpose, and that the judiciary would defer to the legislature's
choices so long as they were reasonable."

Id. at 600.

The Court's decisions in Duckworth and Cartercoincided with the post-Lochner
trend toward respecting the reasonable policy decisions of state legislators. However,
as Justices Jackson, Black, and Frankfurter pointed out, the Court's failure to utilize
the Twenty-First Amendment actually increased the possibility that courts would strike
down state liquor laws. These three Justices regarded the Twenty-First Amendment as
requiring greater deference to state alcohol regulations than even the early post-Lochner Court was willing to provide.
166 In 1958, the Court considered Gordon v. Texas, 355 U.S. 369 (1958) (per
curiam), in which the defendant had been convicted of illegally importing liquor
without obtaining a permit or paying taxes. See Gordon v. State, 310 S.W.2d 328, 329
(Tex. Crim. App. 1956). The Court upheld the challenged portions of Texas's liquor
regulatory regime with a single sentence: "Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Gordon, 355 U.S. at 369. Curiously, the Court also cited
Carterto support its brief ruling. Id. As discussed above, Carterrelied on state police
power doctrine to uphold the challenged law, not the Twenty-First Amendment.
Thus, Gordon seems to constitute a belated nod of approval to Justices Black and
Frankfurter's concurring opinions in Carter that the Court could have equally based
its ruling on the Twenty-First Amendment.
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natory liquor laws under the Twenty-First Amendment. 16 7 During this
same period, however, the Court took various steps to whittle away the
states' Twenty-First Amendment powers in non-dormant Commerce
Clause cases. Notably, in a trilogy of decisions issued between 1964
and 1984, the Court declared that the Twenty-First Amendment had
not stripped Congress of its concurrent power to regulate liquor commerce. 1 68 None of these opinions threatened the Twenty-First
Amendment's preeminence over the dormant Commerce Clause. In
fact, each case paid tribute to the Young's Market line of cases. 169 Nevertheless, when Bacchus170 reached the Supreme Court in 1984, the
Court resuscitated its century-old penchant for striking down state li17 1
quor regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause.
167 Indeed, in the 1966 case of Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S.
35 (1966), the Court once again confirmed the states' sweeping regulatory powers
under the Twenty-First Amendment. Seagram involved a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge to a New York price-affirmation statute, which required liquor producers to
affirm that their New York prices were no higher than the lowest price offered elsewhere in the country during the preceding month. Id. at 39-40. The Court held that
the "mere fact that [New York's price-affirmation statute] is geared to appellants' pricing policies in other States is not sufficient to invalidate the statute." Id. at 43. Beginning in 1983, the Court has subsequently narrowed the states' power to require price
affirmation in a series of three decisions. See infta notes 171 and 195.
168 See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984); Cal. Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon
Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
169 See Capital Cities, 467 U.S. at 712 (noting that Young's Market stands for the
proposition that Section 2 "reserves to the States power to impose burdens on interstate commerce in intoxicating liquor that, absent the Amendment, would clearly be
invalid under the Commerce Clause"); Midcal, 445 U.S. at 107 (pointing to the
Young's Market line of cases in confirming that "each State holds great powers over the
importation of liquor from other jurisdictions"); Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 330 (highlighting the Young's Market line of cases in asserting that the Twenty-First Amendment
renders a state "totally unconfined by traditional Commerce Clause limitations when
it restricts the importation of intoxicants destined for use, distribution, or consumption within its borders").
170 Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
171 It might be argued that the Supreme Court quietly presaged the dormant
Commerce Clause's imminent resurgence in Healy v. United States Brewers Ass'n (Healy
1), 464 U.S. 909 (1983). Decided roughly one year before Bacchus, Healy I revolved
around a Connecticut price-affirmation statute, which sought to prevent beer producers from selling below Connecticut wholesaler prices to any wholesaler in a neighboring state. See U.S. Brewers Ass'n, Inc. v. Healy, 692 F.2d 275, 276 (2d Cir. 1982). The
Second Circuit struck down Connecticut's price-affirmation statute as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 284. Based on the Supreme Court's
ruling in Seagram, the Second circuit acknowledged that Connecticut could require a
beer brewer to "set its Connecticut prices at the lowest levels it [chose] to set in surrounding states." Id. at 283-84. However, the Second Circuit determined that the
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Bacchus and the Full-FledgedReturn ofJudicialActivism:
1984-Present

In Bacchus, out-of-state liquor wholesalers challenged a Hawaiian
law that imposed a twenty percent excise tax on wholesale alcohol
sales. 172 Specifically, the wholesalers protested the law's exemption of
Hawaiian-produced okolehao 173 and fruit wine from the excise tax.
Hawaii's legislature enacted this exemption with the express hope of
encouraging development of the state's liquor industry. 174 The
wholesalers argued that Hawaii's tax regime violated the dormant
175
Commerce Clause by favoring certain in-state beverages.
From the opening lines of its analysis, the Court turned Young's
Market on its head. In Young's Market, the Court began its examination by first asking whether the challenged law fell within the state's
broad Twenty-First Amendment powers. 176 Once the Court determined that the state did possess the requisite regulatory power, it did
not explore whether the law violated the dormant Commerce Clause.
The Bacchus Court, on the other hand, began by subjecting the Hawaiian tax exemption to the modern two-prong dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. 17 7 Finding that "the purpose of the exemption was to
aid Hawaiian industry," 178 the Court deemed the exemption "clearly
discriminatory." 179 Accordingly, Hawaii did not deserve "entitlement
to a more flexible approach permitting inquiry into the balance be80
tween local benefits and the burden on interstate commerce."'
state could not pursue the "far more drastic, and clearly excessive, method of controlling minimum prices at which liquor may be sold outside of its own territory." Id. at
284. In other words, the Second Circuit ruled that Connecticut's price-affirmation
statute did not fall within the Twenty-First Amendment's protection of state laws pertaining to the "delivery or use [of liquor] therein." U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the Second Circuit's decision. Healy I,
464 U.S. at 909. Although the Court refrained from providing any reasoning, it soon
elaborated on the unconstitutionality of price-affirmation statutes shortly after
Bacchus. See infra note 195. Regardless, Healy I signaled that state regulatory power
under the Twenty-First Amendment was not invulnerable to dormant Commerce
Clause challenge.
172 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 265.
173 According to the Court, "[o]kolehao is a brandy distilled from the root of the
ti plant, an indigenous shrub of Hawaii." Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 266.
176 State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936).
177 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 270. For an overview of the Court's strict scrutiny analysis,
see supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
178 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 271.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 270.
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Having ruled that Hawaii's tax exemption "violated the Commerce Clause because it had both the purpose and effect of discriminating in favor of local products," 18 1 the Court then asked whether
the exemption was "saved by the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitation."18 2- Turning to a balancing test, the Court inquired
"whether the principles underlying the Twenty-first Amendment
[were] sufficiently implicated by the [tax] exemption.., to outweigh
the Commerce Clause principles that would otherwise be
18 3
offended."
The Court did not analyze the amendment's text and dismissed
the provision's ratification history as "obscur[e]."'18 4 Despite its professed "[d] oubts about the scope of the Amendment's authorization,"
the Court concluded that "[t] he central purpose of the provision was
not to empower States to favor local liquor industries by erecting barriers to competition." 1 5 Accordingly, the Court struck down Hawaii's
tax exemption "because [it] violate[d] a central tenet of the Commerce Clause but [was] not supported by any clear concern of the
Twenty-first Amendment." 18 6 While the Twenty-First Amendment's
''central purposes" and "clear concerns" played a crucial role in the
Court's decision, the Court did not define these novel terms. Moreover, the Court reached its holding without ever expressly overruling
Young's Market, rather, it jettisoned stare decisis by relegating the case
187
to a footnote.
Justice Stevens, joined by then Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor, dissented on the grounds that "the wholesalers' Commerce Clause claim [was] squarely foreclosed by the Twenty-first
Amendment. 18 8 According to Justice Stevens, the majority adopted a
"totally novel approach to the Twenty-first Amendment."'1 9 In his estimation, the proper question "is not one of 'deference,' nor one of
'central purposes'; the question is whether the provision in this case is
an exercise of a power expressly conferred upon the States by the
Constitution." 190
18]
182
183

Id. at 273.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 275.

184

Id. at 274.

185
186

Id. at 276 (emphasis added).
Id. at 276 (emphasis added).

187

Id. at 274 n.13.

188
189

Id. at 279 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 286-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

190

Id. at 287 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Looking first to the text, Justice Stevens read the amendment to
expressly authorize Hawaii's tax exemption. Because the tax applied
to the sale of liquor intended for consumption in Hawaii, it "[fell]
squarely within the protection given to Hawaii by the . ..Twenty-first
Amendment, which expressly mentions 'delivery or use therein." ' 91
Justice Stevens then reviewed the events leading up to the Twenty-First
Amendment's enactment, highlighting Congress's efforts to overturn
Leisy by divesting liquor of its interstate character. 192 Moreover, he
retrieved Justice Brandeis's Young's Market opinion from the majority's
footnotes and pointed out the Court's previous adherence to a broad
interpretation of the amendment. 93 Ultimately, Justice Stevens
concluded:
If the State has the constitutional power to create a total local monopoly-thereby imposing the most severe form of discrimination
on competing products originating elsewhere-I believe it may also
engage in a less extreme form of discrimination that merely provides a special benefit
94

.

.

.

for locally produced

alcoholic

beverages.1
Unlike Justice Stevens's bright-line approach-which would have
respected text, history, and stare decisis-the majority opinion reverted to its pre-Webb-Kenyon Act judicial activism. Ignoring the
amendment's text, eschewing prior case law, and dismissing the provision's history, the Court opted for a vague balancing test that enabled
broad judicial discretion. By applying its dormant Commerce Clause
analysis first, the Court placed a presumption of invalidity on the challenged state law-a presumption states can only overcome by wading
into a murky realm of "central purposes" and "clear concerns."1 9 5
This failure to specify the Twenty-First Amendment's "central
purposes" or "clear concerns" rendered Bacchus a blank check for fu191 Id. at 280 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192 Id. at 280-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193 Id. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 286 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195 Just as Bacchus brushed aside Young's Market, two post-Bacchus cases dealing
with price-affirmation statutes obliterated Seagram, see supranote 167 and accompanying text, without expressly overruling its holding. First, in Brown-FormanDistillers Corp.
v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986), the Court struck down a New
York price-affirmation statute because it had "the 'practical effect' [of] control[ling]
liquor prices in other States." Id. at 583 (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan,
325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945)). Similarly, in Healy v. BeerInstitute,491 U.S. 324 (1989), the
Court overturned a Connecticut price-affirmation law because "the Commerce Clause
...precludes application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly
outside the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the
State." Id. at 336 (citations omitted).
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ture judicial activism. The Bacchus Court hinted that "combat[ing]
the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in liquor"' 9 6 constituted
at least one of the amendment's "central purposes." On the other
hand, the Court held that "mere economic protectionism" 9 7 could
notjustify discriminatory state regulation. More recently, in North Dakota v. United States,198 the Court implied that "promoting temperance,
ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenue" 9 9 might
pass muster as legitimate exercises of state power under the TwentyFirst Amendment. However, North Dakota revolved around the
Supremacy Clause, not the dormant Commerce Clause. 200 Because a
precise definition of "central purposes" and "clear concerns" remains
elusive, the appellate courts have drastically diverged in their ap201
proaches to applying Bacchus to state direct-shipment laws.
III.

NEw WINE: STATE DIRECT-SHIPMENT LAWS
AND THE CIRCUIT COURTS

A.

The Uncorked Controversy of State Direct-Shipment Laws

To be precise, state direct-shipment laws themselves do not constitute "new wine"; rather, many such laws have been on the books
since shortly after the Twenty-First Amendment's ratification.2 0 2 Following Prohibition's demise, the vast majority of states implemented a
three-tier regulatory system whereby alcohol producers (tier one) sell
their products to state-licensed wholesalers (tier two), who in turn sell
the goods to state-licensed retailers (tier three), who may then sell to
consumers. 20 3 Statesjustify this three-tier regime on the grounds that
it ensures the orderly collection of taxes, prevents the vertical and horizontal integration of the state alcohol market, and helps fulfill tem20 4
perance goals.
Despite direct-shipment laws' vintage status, the advent of e-commerce and several recent developments in the wine industry have
196
197

Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 276.
Id.

198 495 U.S. 423 (1990).
199

Id. at 432.

200
201

Id. at 426.
See infra Part III.

202

See Ann Faircloth, The Crackdown on Booze-of-the-Month Clubs: Mail-Order Wine

Buyers, Beware!, FORTUNE, Feb. 16, 1998, at 46.
203 Russ Miller, Note, The Wine Is in the Mail: The Twenty-First Amendment and State
Laws Against the Direct Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages, 54 VAND. L. REv. 2495, 2497
(2001).
204 See Susan Lorde Martin, Changingthe Law: Updatefrom the Wine War, 17 J.L. &
POL. 63, 64 (2001); Patterson, supra note 101, at 763.
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combined to make the laws a celebrated new legal issue. The 1990s
witnessed a stunning boom in the number of wineries and the volume
of wine sales. Between 1995 and 2000, the number of wineries nationwide increased by fourteen percent.20 5 The decade also experienced
a 1579% increase in the sale of wines priced greater than fifteen
2 06
dollars.
Generally, however, only the major labels like Kendall-Jackson
possess the sales volumes capable of profitably penetrating the threetier system in all fifty states. 20 7 Many connoisseurs can obtain bottles
of their favorite boutique wines only by traveling to out-of-state wineries or having the wine shipped directly to their homes.2 0 8 Thanks to
the rise of e-commerce, consumers can now order wine from all over
the world with the click of a mouse. 20 9 To salvage their three-tier systems-and the significant amount of tax revenue they generate2 10
states began aggressively enforcing direct-shipment laws.
The myriad direct-shipment laws adopted at the state level provide a prime example of federalism in action. By turning alcohol regulation over to the states, the Twenty-First Amendment encouraged a
diverse legal regime that tailors itself to local attitudes about alcohol.
According to the Wine Institute (an organization that represents the
interests of California wineries), direct-shipment laws fall into three
broad categories: 2 11 (1) twenty-four states prohibit direct shipments of
wine, and four of those states make direct-shipment violations a fel205 Martin, supra note 17, at 2.
206 Andrew J. Kozusko III, Note, The Fight to "Free the Grapes" Enters Federal Court:
ConstitutionalChallenges to the Validity of State Prohibitionson the Direct Shipment of Alcohol,
20J.L. & CoM. 75, 77-78 (2000). In 1999, Chase Bailey, a former Cisco Systems executive, made his contribution to the 1990s wine boom by purchasing one large bottle

of 1992 Screaming Eagle Cabernet Sauvignon for $500,000 at an auction. Id. at
75-76, 75 n.3.
207 See Vijay Shanker, Note, Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws, the Commerce Clause, and
the Twenty-First Amendment, 85 VA. L. REv. 353, 364 (1999); Stephanie Ahrens Waller,
Note, Bacchus Rules: Recent Court Decisions on the Direct Shipment of Wine, 40 Hous. L.
REV. 1111, 1114 (2003).

208 See Shanker, supra note 207, at 367.
209 In fact, "a Solomon Smith Barney study suggests that internet wine sales will go
from under $100 million in 1998 to nearly $3 billion by 2005." Martin, supranote 17,
at 8-9 (citing Review & Outlook: America's Musty Wine Laws, WALL ST. J., June 1, 2000,
at A22).

210

Shanker, supra note 207, at 356.

211

See Wine Institute, Direct Shipment Laws by State for Wineries, at http://www.wine

institute.org/shipwine/analysis/intro-analysis.htm (last visited May 8, 2004). Other
commentators divide direct-shipment laws into roughly the same three categories. See
Douglass, supra note 119, at 1648-49; Shanker, supra note 207, at 356-57.
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ony;2 1 2 (2) fourteen states place various limits on direct shipments,
such as mandating special permits, imposing particular tax deadlines,
and requiring consumers to place their direct-shipment orders "onsite" at the out-of-state winery;2 1 3 and (3) thirteen "reciprocity" states
allow direct-shipments only from states that extend the same courtesy
to their own wineries. 2 14 The Wine Institute's categorization system
demonstrates the vast array of approaches states have taken to address
the direct-shipment issue.
The most controversial direct-shipment laws require wineries to
obtain permits to ship their products directly to consumers, yet allow
only local residents to apply for these permits. Faced with such discrimination, oenophiles and small out-of-state wineries challenged direct-shipment laws in the courts. 2 15 On one side, states and
wholesalers contend that direct-shipment laws are crucial to maintaining orderly market conditions, collecting taxes, and preventing minors from obtaining alcohol over the Internet.2 1 6 Wine producers
and consumers counter that the desire for orderly market conditions
and tax collection cannot run afoul of the dormant Commerce
Clause. 2 17 Moreover, they contend that less onerous measures exist to
prevent underage drinkers from abusing direct shipping. 2 18 This
Note now turns to the six circuit court decisions on the issue.

212 See Wine Institute, supra note 211 (grouping Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Vermont under the heading "Direct-toConsumer Shipment Prohibited," and denoting Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, and
Utah as "felony for winery to direct ship" states).
213 See id. (including Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia,
Washington, D.C., and Wyoming under the category of "Limited Direct Shipping &
Permit States").
214 See id. (categorizing California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin as
"Reciprocity" states).
215

See infra Part III.B.

216

See Martin, supra note 17, at 5-6.

217

See id. at 8.

218 See id. at 37-39 (discussing a model direct-shipment law that requires common
carriers who deliver alcohol to check the identification and obtain the signature of a
person age twenty-one years or older at the delivery address); Shanker, supra note
207, at 358-59 (asserting that "[aiccess by minors can ... be prevented by protective
mechanisms, such as requiring adult signatures upon delivery and warning labels on
packages").
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Life After Bacchus: Circuit Court Decisions on the
Direct-Shipment Issue

Thus far, six circuit courts have weighed in on the constitutionality of direct-shipment laws. Of these six, two upheld the challenged
direct-shipment laws; 2 19 three struck down the discriminatory state
laws for violating the dormant Commerce Clause; 2 20 and one remanded to the district court for further evidence. 2 2 1 These cases reveal that Bacchus's vague two-prong test has generated confusion,
inconsistency, and an even greater depletion of the states' regulatory
power over alcohol.
1.

Dismissing Two-Prong Tests and Upholding Direct-Shipment
Laws: Bridenbaugh (Seventh Circuit) and Swedenburg
(Second Circuit)

Despite Bacchus's centrality to the Supreme Court's Twenty-First
Amendment and dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, both the
Seventh and Second Circuits refused to utilize the case's two-prong
test. The Seventh Circuit was the first appellate court to address state
direct-shipment laws in Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson.222 Bridenbaugh
involved an Indiana law requiring out-of-state wine sellers to obtain a
wholesaler license before importing wine directly to in-state consumers.223 The plaintiffs, a group of consumers, challenged the law as a
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.2 2 4 Although Indiana
only granted these permits to state residents-a seemingly discriminatory practice-the plaintiffs did not attack this provision. 2 25 Rather,
their claim "concerned only . . .direct shipments from out-of-state
sellers who lack [ed] and [did] not want Indiana permits." 226
Judge Easterbrook began his analysis in a fashion true to the
Young's Market line of cases. Acknowledging that both parties' briefs
focused on the Twenty-First Amendment's "core purposes," the court
asserted that "our guide is the text and history of the Constitution, not
the 'purposes' or 'concerns' that may or may not have animated its
219 Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 237 (2d Cir. 2004); Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 854 (7th Cir. 2000).
220 Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 527 (6th Cir. 2003); Dickerson v. Bailey, 336
F.3d 388, 409-10 (5th Cir. 2003); Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 517 (4th Cir. 2003).
221 Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1116 (11th Cir. 2002).
222 227 F.3d at 848.
223 Id. at 849.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 854.
226 Id.
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drafters. Objective indicators supply the context for § 2; suppositions
about mental processes are unilluminating."' 2 27 Judge Easterbrook
then conducted a historical overview of the events leading up to the
Twenty-First Amendment's enactment. 228 Drawing on this history, he
concluded, "[n] o longer may the dormant Commerce Clause be read
to protect interstate shipments of liquor from regulation: § 2 speaks
directly to these shipments.."229 In other words, up to this point in the

opinion, Judge Eaterbrook seemed precariously close to completely
ignoring Bacchus.
However, Judge Easterbrook then summarized the Supreme
Court's Twenty-First Amendment jurisprudence as holding that "the
greater power to forbid imports does not imply the lesser power to
allow imports on discriminatory terms." 230 Because Indiana insisted
"every drop of liquor pass through its three-tier system and be subjected to taxation," 2 31 the court found no such discrimination and up23 2
held the challenged provision of Indiana's direct-shipment law.

Based on the Seventh Circuit's approach, any law discriminating
against foreign liquor is unconstitutional-end of analysis. The
Twenty-First Amendment's "core concerns" do not apply and cannot
save an otherwise discriminatory law. Thus, paradoxically, even
though it upheld Indiana's law, and largely ignored the Supreme
227
228
229
230
231

Id. at 851.
Id. at 851-53.
Id. at 853.
Id.
Id.

232 Id. at 854. Before taking the benchJudge Easterbrook represented the liquor
importers and succeeded in overturning Hawaii's liquor-tax scheme in Bacchus. Interestingly, Judge Easterbrook's Bridenbaugh opinion not only eschews the Supreme
Court's two-prong test from Bacchus, it also conflicts in certain respects with the arguments he made before the Supreme Court in that case. Just as Judge Easterbrook
determined in Bridenbaughthat the Twenty-First Amendment did not permit discrimination against out-of-state commerce, his clients' brief in Bacchus asserted that "Section 2...
provides no basis for discriminatory state taxes." Brief for Appellant at 29,
Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (No. 82-1565). In this respect, his
Bridenbaugh opinion and the Bacchus brief are entirely consistent.
However, the brief also argued that "[t]he centralpupose of section 2 was to allow
states wishing entirely to exclude alcoholic beverages from their borders to do so." Id.
(emphasis added). Judge Easterbrook supported his understanding of Section 2's
"central purpose" by citing Senators Blaine's and Borah's remarks during the floor
debates on S.J. Res. 211. Id. at 34; see also supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
In other words, the Bacchus brief refutes Judge Easterbrook's quip in Bridenbaugh that
"our guide is the text and history of the Constitution, not the 'purposes' or 'concerns'
that may or may not have animated its drafters." Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 851. Ironically, the "central purpose" approach Judge Easterbrook zealously advocated before
the Supreme Court in Bacchus became the very approach he rejected in Bridenbaugh.
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Court's methodology, the Seventh Circuit placed even greater limits
on state liquor control than Bacchus.
In Swedenburg v. Kelly, 233 the Second Circuit also dismissed
Bacchus's two-prong test and upheld New York's direct-shipment law.
Under New York law, out-of-state wineries can obtain licenses to ship
wine directly to New York consumers. 234 To secure this license, however, the out-of-state wineries must first establish and maintain a physical presence (e.g., branch office or warehouse) in New York. 23 5 Two
out-of-state wineries and three New York wine consumers challenged
the licensing scheme for "provid[ing] an unconstitutional advantage
23 6
to in-state wineries."
Writing for the court, Judge Wesley expressly rejected Bacchus's
analytical framework: "We think this two-step approach is flawed because it has the effect of unnecessarily limiting the authority delegated
to the states through the clear and unambiguous language of section
2."237 Acknowledging that other courts regarded Bacchus's two-prong
test as binding precedent, Judge Wesley responded in a footnote that
"1[w] e are hard pressed to find any mandate from the Court directing
us to utilize Bacchus as a template in analyzing the New York statute."2 38 Rather, he reasoned, Bacchus merely stands for the proposi-

tion that states cannot "invoke section 2 as a pretext for economic
23 9
protectionism."
The Second Circuit instead opted for a "second mode of analy24
sis,"240 which derived from the court's interpretation of the history '

and jurisprudence 242 underlying Section 2. This alternative approach
"considers the scope of the Twenty-first Amendment's grant of authority to the states to determine whether the challenged statute is within
the ambit of that authority, such that it is exempted from the effect of
the dormant Commerce Clause." 24 3 According to the Second Circuit,
New York's "regulatory regime falls squarely within the ambit of section 2's grant of authority... [because it] regulates only the importa244
tion and distribution of alcohol in New York."

233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244

Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 229.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 236 n.10.
Id.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 231-33.
Id. at 233-37.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 237.
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Moreover, Judge Wesley asserted that New York's law does not
245
run afoul of Bacchus's ban on "'mere economic protectionism,'"
because "[a] 11 wineries, whether in-state or out-of-state, are permitted
to obtain a license as long as the winery establishes a physical presence
in the state.

' 246

Judge Wesley conceded that New York's law "could

create substantial dormant Commerce Clause problems if [it] regulated a commodity other than alcohol." 24 7 Indeed, "out-of-state wineries will incur some costs in establishing and maintaining a physical
presence in New York, costs not incurred by in-state wineries." 248 Despite such discrimination, the court ruled that "[t] hese effects ...

do

24 9
not alter the legitimacy of section 2's delegation of authority."
Although the Second Circuit claimed to adopt the Seventh Circuit's analytical approach, 250 Judge Wesley's and Judge Easterbrook's
opinions seem to allow for different amounts of state power under the
Twenty-First Amendment. According to Bridenbaugh,the Twenty-First
Amendment cannot save discriminatory state liquor laws. Swedenburg,
on the other hand, suggests that the Twenty-First Amendment enables
states to enact some discriminatory liquor laws, so long as the laws
serve valid regulatory interests. By limiting Bacchus, and relying instead on a test that places state liquor laws largely beyond the dormant
Commerce Clause's reach, the Second Circuit seemingly took a step
toward reviving Young's Market. As the following cases demonstrate,
however, the Second Circuit is currently the only appellate court to
move in this direction.

2.

Faithful to Bacchus- Beskind (Fourth Circuit) and Dickerson
(Fifth Circuit)

Unlike the Seventh and Second Circuits, the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits followed Bacchus's two-pronged approach as faithfully as possible. In Beskind v. Easley,25 1 a California winery and individual oenophiles challenged North Carolina's direct-shipment laws. 252 North

Carolina's laws required all out-of-state wine producers to sell through
the state's three-tier system but allowed in-state wine manufacturers to
ship their products directly to consumers. 25 3 The plaintiffs alleged
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253

Id. (quoting Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984)).
Id.
Id. at 238.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 231.
325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 509.
Id. at 510.
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that this discrepancy between out-of-state and in-state wine producers
254
constituted unconstitutional discrimination.
Writing for the court, Judge Niemeyer noted that Bacchus required him to first consider whether North Carolina's law was facially
discriminatory and then, if so, to determine if the Twenty-First
Amendment saved the otherwise unconstitutional law. 25 5 In accor-

dance with this two-prong approach, the court began by subjecting
North Carolina's law to a strict scrutiny analysis. 256 After determining
the law facially discriminated against out-of-state wine, Judge
Niemeyer concluded the state had failed to satisfy its burden of demonstrating that no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives
25 7
existed.
Next, Judge Niemeyer considered whether the facially discriminatory law served "'any clear concern of the Twenty-first Amendment'
and [was] thereby saved." 25 8 To further define these "clear concerns,"
the Fourth Circuit adopted the North Dakota Court's three criteria of
"'promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and
raising revenue.' "259 After considering the state's justifications for its
discriminatory regulatory regime, the court concluded the state's law
"could not credibly be portrayed as anything other than local economic boosterism in the guise of a law aimed at alcoholic beverage
control." 260 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit struck down the residency requirement provision of North Carolina's direct-shipment
26 1
statute.
Similarly, in Dickerson v. Baiey,2 6 2 the Fifth Circuit considered the
constitutionality of a Texas law that allowed in-state-but not out-ofstate-wine producers to ship their products directly to Texas consumers. 263 Moreover, the statute enabled Texas wineries to sell 25,000
gallons of wine directly to in-state consumers each year (with no per
customer restrictions), but annually allowed Texans to personally
264
bring into the state only three gallons from an out-of-state winery.
254

Id. at 511.

255 Id. at 513-14.
256 See id. at 514-16.
257 Id. at 515-16.
258 Id. at 516 (quoting Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984)).
259 Id. at 513, 516 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432
(1990)).
260 Id. at 517.
261 Id.
262 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003).
263 Id. at 397.
264 Id. at 397-98.
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A group of oenophiles from Houston alleged that these provisions vio265
lated the dormant Commerce Clause.
Like the Fourth Circuit, Judge Wiener of the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that Supreme Court precedent prescribed use of
Bacchus's two-prong test.2 66 Noting the statute's facial discrimination,

and highlighting the Texas Legislature's candid declarations of its discriminatory aspirations, 26 7 the court asserted the case's "operable facts
*

.

. [were] identical" to those in Bacchus.2 68 Accordingly, Judge Wie-

ner ruled that the Texas law discriminated against interstate commerce 26 9 and did not constitute the only available means by which
270
Texas could achieve its regulatory goals.
Turning to the Bacchus test's second prong, the court initially
cited "the promotion of temperance" as the amendment's core concern. 271 However, it then noted some courts had also incorporated
other policies into the test, such as "the prevention of monopolies or
organized crime from (re)gaining control of the alcohol industry and
the collection of taxes." 272 Regardless, the court's second stage of
analysis did not need to proceed much past this point. The administrator of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission "reject[ed] outright any requirement that he proffer evidence connecting the
disputed statutes to the 'core concerns' of the Twenty-first Amendment."2 73 Given that the administrator had not presented any argu-

ments to the contrary, the Fifth Circuit struck down Texas' law as
2 74
unconstitutional.
The Fourth and Fifth Circuit opinions demonstrated the confusion resulting from the Supreme Court's failure to define the TwentyFirst Amendment's "core concerns" in Bacchus. While the Fourth Circuit looked to the three criteria set forth in North Dakota, the Fifth
Circuit hinted at a narrower test, which may have focused on the "promotion of temperance." Depending on which definition of "core concerns" a court adopts, the range of acceptable justifications for a
state's regulatory regime can vary considerably.
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

392.
394-95.
399-400.
400.
402-03.
401-02.
404.
406.
407.
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Scrutinizing the "Core Concerns": Bainbridge (Eleventh Circuit)
and Heald (Sixth Circuit)

The Eleventh and Sixth Circuits applied Bacchus's two-prong test
in novel ways and placed even stricter limits on state regulatory power.
In Bainbridgev. Turner,27 5 Judge Tjoflat of the Eleventh Circuit considered a challenge to Florida's direct-shipment laws, which allowed instate wineries to ship directly to consumers. 2 76 Out-of-state wineries,
on the other hand, risked treble damages and a felony conviction for
277
directly shipping their products.
Like the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, the Bainbridge court recited
the need to follow Bacchus.27 8 And similarly, the court found Florida's

law facially discriminatory and determined that nondiscriminatory alternatives existed. 27 9 Turning to the test's second prong, however, the
Eleventh Circuit took an unprecedented step: it required the state to
not only facially demonstrate that its law satisfied the Twenty-First
Amendment's "core concerns," but it also mandated the production
of extensive supporting evidence.2 80 Noting that it lacked clear guidance from the Supreme Court on the definition of "core concerns,"
Judge Tjoflat settled on North Dakota's three criteria. 28 1 Although
Florida asserted that its law facilitated temperance, orderly market
conditions, and the collection of revenue, 28 2 the court deemed such
justifications unsatisfactory. 283 Rather, Florida had to demonstrate "its
statutory scheme [was] necessary to effectuate the proffered core concern in a way thatjustifie [d] treating out-of-state firms differently from
in-state firms-a fact question." 284 This evidentiary standard was allegedly "far less than the strict scrutiny required under a traditional tierone analysis of discriminatory laws." 285 Regardless, it still required the

court to remand Bainbridge for further consideration of Florida's
286
justification.
275
276
277
278

311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1106-07.
Id. at 1107; see also notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
Id. at 1108.

279 Id. at 1109-10.
280 Id. at 1114.
281 Id.at 1113-14.
282

Id.at 1114-15.

283 See id.
284 Id. at 1115.
285 Id. at 1115 n.17.
286 Id.1115-16.
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Judge Daughtrey of the Sixth Circuit adopted an even stricter evidentiary standard in Heald v. Engler.28 7 Michigan's direct-shipment
laws allowed in-state wineries to obtain a wholesaler's license but did
not extend the same privilege to out-of-state wineries. 28 8 Consequently, a collection of wine consumers, a small out-of-state winery,
and wine journalists brought a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.2 8

9

After addressing the first-prong of Bacchus and finding

Michigan's law "facially discriminatory," 2 90 the court moved to the second-prong analysis.
The Sixth Circuit struggled to define the Twenty-First Amendment's "core concerns." Earlier in its opinion, the court acknowledged that "[s]ince Bacchus, the Supreme Court has been less than
prolific in construing the content of the Twenty-first Amendment's
'core concerns.'

''29 1

Thus, when it began the prong-two "core con-

cern" analysis, it initially cited North Dakota's three policies as the appropriate standard. 292 Yet, two paragraphs later, Judge Daughtrey
declared that the court could not rely on North Dakota because it "involved a Supremacy Clause challenge and did not implicate the Commerce Clause.

'293

Accordingly, the court stated it needed to rely on

"cases that do discuss the intersection of the Twenty-first Amendment

and the Commerce Clause, such as Bacchus.''294 Unable to identify a

suitable definition for "core concerns," the court forged ahead with its
analysis.
Next, Judge Daughtrey curiously incorporated Bacchus's prongone strict scrutiny standard into her prong-two analysis. Although
Bacchus's prong-one test requires courts to apply a strict scrutiny standard to facially discriminatory laws, prong-two specifies no such standard of review. 295 Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit claimed that
"Supreme Court precedent" required strict scrutiny when determining whether the Twenty-First Amendment empowered Michigan to
enact discriminatory liquor laws. 29 6 Because it was "not enough that
the Michigan Legislature ha[d] chosen this particular regulatory
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296

342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003).
See id. at 520.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 525.
Id. at 523.
Id. at 525-26.
Id. at 526.
Id.
See supra notes 177-86 and accompanying text.
Heald, 342 F.3d at 527.
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scheme to further what are legitimate objectives," 29 7 the Sixth Circuit
29 8
struck down the state's direct-shipment law.

Needless to say, this type of circuit court disarray would have
never occurred under Justice Brandeis's simple bright-line rule from
Young's Market.299 Yet such is the price of the Court's intervention
into an area of commerce that Congress deemed best handled by the
states. So long as the Supreme Court maintains its vague two-prong
test, the lower courts will continue to reach disparate holdings, and
state regulatory power over alcohol will commensurately dwindle. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should utilize direct-shipment laws as
an opportunity to overturn Bacchus and reinstate the Young's Market
line of cases.
IV.

RUPTURE OR RENEWAL: WHEN DIRECT-SHIPMENT LAWS

MEET THE REHNQUIST COURT

Thus far, this Note has discussed numerous cases dealing with the
Twenty-First Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause; markedly, not a single one mentioned the principle of federalism. In the
years following Bacchus, however, the Supreme Court has increasingly
relied upon federalist values to strike down federal laws.30 0 Indeed,
"[i] t seems agreed on all sides now that the Supreme Court has an
' 30 1
agenda of promoting constitutional federalism."
This purported "antifederalist revival"3 0 2 has not enjoyed broad
support within the Court. On the contrary, the Court's recent cases
involving federalism have divided along 5-4 lines, with Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas in the majority, andJustice StevensJustice SouterJustice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer dissenting.3 0 3 This Part explores directshipment laws in the context of the 5-4 federalism split. The TwentyFirst Amendment constitutes a rare example of Congress and the
30 4
states shifting the balance of federalism in favor of state power.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 527-28.
299 See supra Part II.A.1.
300 Between 1991 and 2002, the Court "held at least ten federal statutes to be
constitutionally invalid, either in whole or in part, on grounds involving federalism.
By contrast, the Court had found only one federal statute to violate principles of constitutional federalism during the previous span of more than fifty years ... Fallon,
supra note 35, at 430.
301 Id. at 429.
302 SuLLvAN & GUNTHER, supra note 26, at 230.
303 See Fallon, supra note 35, at 430.
304 See supra Part I.C.

2004]

NEW

WINE

IN

OLD

WINESKINS

1603

Thus, paradoxically, Justices on both sides of the 5-4 divide-those
who support the judicial enforcement of federalism and those who
favor a political solution-have ample reason to uphold direct-shipment laws on federalism grounds. Moreover, in the interests of salvaging the dormant Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment,
both camps should vote to overrule Bacchus.
A.

The Fragile Seams of Federalism

1. States' Rights and the Current Five-Justice Majority
On one side of the debate stands the five-Justice majority, which
used federalism to strike down multiple federal laws for unconstitu30 5
tionally encroaching upon state sovereignty. United States v. Lopez
constitutes perhaps the most famous example of the Court's willingness to intervene on the states' behalf. In Lopez, the Court considered
the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which made it
a federal offense for an individual to knowingly possess a firearm in a
school zone. 30 6 During the roughly sixty years prior to Lopez, the
Court did not overturn a single exercise of congressional commerce
power; 30 7 thus, the Commerce Clause acquired an aura of virtual
omnipotence.
However, the Lopez Court unexpectedly halted this trend.30, In
an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that
Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause and struck
down the Gun-Free School Zones Act.3 0 9 Although the Court did not
overturn any of its prior decisions, the opinion made it clear that Congress could no longer "convert [its] authority under the Commerce
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States."3 1 0
305 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
306 See id. at 551.
307 See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 26, at 137-49 (providing an overview of
the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence between 1937 and 1995).
308 The unexpectedness of the Court's decision is aptly illustrated by Professor
Jesse H. Choper's pre-Lopez prediction that "the Supreme Court will uphold the constitutionality of [the Gun-Free School Zones Act] .... The true surprise will be if
there are many dissenting votes." Jesse H. Choper, The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Conditions:Federalism and IndividualRights, 4 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 460, 463
(1995).
309 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
310 Id. at 567; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000)
(holding that § 13,981 of the Violence Against Women Act exceeded Congress's commerce power).

16o 4

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 79:4

Following this decision, some commentators declared that a states'

3 11
rights revolution was officially underway within the Court.
Two years later, in Printz v. United States, 312 the Court struck down
a portion of the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act, which required state law enforcement officers to help administer federal background checks on prospective handgun purchasers. 3 13 Because the
Act constituted "executive-commandeering" of state officers, the
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, declared the law "fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty." 3 14 This ruling established that the principle of federalism
prevented Congress from commanding state officers to enforce a federal regulatory scheme.
Combined with multiple cases upholding state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, 15 decisions like Lopez and
Printz signal a trend toward curbing the federal government's power.
While some commentators viewed this jurisprudential shift as drastic
"right-wing judicial activism," 316 others labeled the Court's purported
federalism agenda as "modest and equivocal."3 17 Regardless, respect
for state sovereignty has enjoyed a resurgence under the Rehnquist
Court.
Professor Susan Lorde Martin focuses on the Lopez and Printz line
of cases to predict the Court's ruling on direct-shipment laws. 3 18 Not-

311 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Focus on FederalPower,N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1995, at
Al (asserting "it is only a slight exaggeration to say that.., the Court [is] a single vote
shy of reinstalling the Articles of Confederation").
312 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
313 Id. at 902-04.
314 Id. at 916, 935.
315 See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-92 (2000) (ruling that
Congress cannot use its civil rights enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 712-30 (1999) (extending state sovereign immunity to lawsuits brought against
states in state court); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54-73 (1996) (holding
that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce
Clause). Based in part on his overview of the Rehnquist Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, see Martin, supra note 23, at 1333-42, one commentator concludes that the Court "will, unfortunately, uphold the power of the states to prohibit
and limit the direct-shipment of wine from out-of-state." Id. at 1344.
316 See Cass R. Sunstein, Tilting the Scales Rightward, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2001, at
A23.
317 Robert F. Nagel, Real Revolution, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 985, 1003-04 (1997).
318 See Martin, supra note 17, at 22-25; see also Eng, supra note 23, at 1915-16
(drawing upon the Printz and Lopez line of cases to argue that the "conservative"
Rehnquist Court will likely uphold state direct-shipment laws). Although he does not
mention specific cases, Professor Brannon P. Denning asserts that "[t]here is a certain
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ing the Court's "recent record of state's rights in a variety of circumstances," Professor Martin suggests the Court's potential willingness to
strike down direct-shipment laws "is far from a certainty."3 1 9 She notes
that the Lopez Court overturned the Gun-Free School Zones Act on
the grounds that "criminal law is a subject of primary state responsibility."3 20 Accordingly, the Court may uphold direct-shipment laws because "alcoholic beverage control is, too, a subject of primary state
responsibility . . . [and i]f federalism is to have real meaning, there

3 21
have to be some areas in which states have exclusive power."
Professor Martin correctly points out that the likes of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor will probably view direct-shipment laws at least partly in terms of states' rights. Indeed, the TwentyFirst Amendment constitutes one of the Constitution's few express
commitments of state power. These two Justices dissented in Bacchus
on the grounds that the amendment's broad constitutional language
gave states the power to discriminate against out-of-state liquor.3 2 2 To
protect the states' constitutionally ensured right to regulate alcohol,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor very well might vote to
overturn Bacchus and uphold direct-shipment laws.
However, the dissenting opinion from Bacchus also provides the
major reason why Professor Martin's analysis of federalism and directshipment laws comes up short: Justice Stevens. Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion suggests he will view dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state direct-shipment laws as "squarely foreclosed by the
Twenty-first Amendment."3 2 3 Yet, his views on federalism are diametrically opposed to those of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor. Thus, if Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and
Justice Stevens find the two additional votes necessary to overturn
Bacchus, their holding will not fit into the current "antifederalist
324
revival."
irony that in the midst of the most vigorous judicial enforcement of federalism in over
sixty years, a specific textual reservation of power to states [i.e., the Twenty-First
Amendment] has been eroded almost to the point of irrelevance." Denning, supra
note 111, at 335.
319 Martin, supra note 17, at 22.
320 Id. at 23.
321 Id.
322 See supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
323 468 U.S. 263, 279 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
324 But see Timothy Schnabel, Note, A Circuit-SplittingHeadache: The Hangover of the
Supreme Court's Twenty-First Amendment Jurisprudence,21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 547, 556
(2003) (positing that "an even more aggressively pro-state outcome is possible should
two additional Justices side with the three Bacchus dissenters and hold that even discriminatory statutes are permitted").

I 6o6

2.

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL- 79:4

Politically Enforced Federalism: The Curious Case of Justice
Stevens

How can one explain Justice
Twenty-First Amendment based on
answer lies partly in a pre-Lopez and
Court has yet to expressly overrule-

Stevens's broad reading of the
the principle of federalism? The
pre-Printzcase that the Rehnquist
Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan

Transit Authority.a2 5 As mentioned in the Introduction, much of the

current Court's disagreement over federalism revolves around
whether the political system or the courts should serve as the doctine's primary guardian. The direct-shipment law issue presents a
unique situation in which the lines separating these two theories become blurred.
In Garcia, the Court ruled that the Fair Labor Standards Act's
minimum wage and overtime requirements applied to a municipal
transit authority. 326 Justice Stevens joined Justice Blackmun's 5-4 majority opinion, which asserted the "principal means chosen by the
Framers to insure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the
structure of the Federal Government itself. '3 27 Because the political
system had settled on a policy requiring state compliance with federal
labor standards, there was no need for the "unelected federal judiciary to [decide] which state policies it favor[ed] and which ones it dislike[d]. '"328 Justice O'Connor countered in her dissenting opinion
that "lIt] he problems of federalism. . . are capable of a more responsible resolution than holding that the States as States retain no status
29
apart from that which Congress chooses to let them retain."3
Rather, she asserted, the Court needed to intervene when the federal
330
government overstepped its bounds.
Although Justice O'Connor's view appears to have since gained
the upper hand, Justice Stevens and his fellow Lopez/Printz dissenters
continue to prefer political solutions to purported imbalances in the
federalist system. For example, in Printz,Justice Stevens argued in dissent that "unelected judges are better off leaving the protection of
federalism to the political process in all but the most extraordinary
325 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
326 Id. at 555-56.
327 Id. at 550.
328 Id. at 546.
329 Id. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
330 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In his terse dissenting opinion, ChiefJustice
Rehnquist wrote: "I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out
further the fine points of principle that will, I am confident, in time again command
support of the majority of this Court." Id. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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circumstances." 33 1 When Congress has determined how to best "serve
the interests of cooperative federalism," he argued, the courts should
"respect both its policy judgment and its appraisal of its constitutional
332

power."
The Twenty-First Amendment exemplifies Justice Stevens's desire
for political solutions to issues of federalism. Throughout the more
than one hundred years leading up to Prohibition, Congress evinced a
clear preference for allowing the states to broadly regulate the liquor
trade. This policy predilection derived from a belief that alcohol constituted a peculiar article of commerce best left to local regulatory
regimes. The federal government's resounding failure to effectively
enforce nationwide prohibition only confirmed this conviction. Thus,
Congress and the states joined forces to push through a constitutional
amendment to ensure the states' dominion over liquor intended for
"delivery or use therein. ' 33 3 Viewed in such a light, Justice Stevens's
broad interpretation of the Twenty-First Amendment neatly squares
with his vision of federalism.
Accordingly, the Twenty-First Amendment fosters the unlikely
confluence of Printz and Garcia-on the one hand, it constitutes a
commitment to states' rights; on the other, it represents a political
solution to federalism. Taken together, these two values provide at
least one way of bridging the traditional 5-4 federalism divide. Even if
the Court refrains from expressly discussing federalism when it takes
up the direct-shipment issue, it should keep federalist values in mind.
Otherwise, the reasoning underpinning each side of the federalism
debate will incur ajurisprudential rupture. If the Court's states' rights
advocates meekly uphold Bacchus in striking down direct-shipment
laws, they will abdicate their professed duty to defend state sovereignty. If the Court's proponents of politically determined federalism
follow the same path, they will let judicial activism trump Congress
and the states' joint solution to the liquor conundrum. Thus, both
sides of the federalism debate should seize upon direct-shipment laws
as an opportunity to renew the Young's Market line of cases.
B.

The Ever Expanding Dormant Commerce Clause

Should the Court overrule Bacchus and uphold direct-shipment
laws, it will also preserve another imperiled piece of its jurisprudential
patchwork: the dormant Commerce Clause. Unlike the principle of
federalism, which the Court's Twenty-First Amendment jurisprudence
331
332
333

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 959 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 970 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
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has steadily eroded, the dormant Commerce Clause runs the risk of
rupturing because it has expanded too far. Beginning with In re
Rahrer,33 4 the Court has consistently affirmed the notion that Congress
can utilize its commerce power to revoke the Court's use of the dormant Commerce Clause.
Through the Wilson Act and the Webb-Kenyon Act, Congress attempted to exercise its power to divest liquor of its interstate character. Intending to take this concept one step further, Congress and the
states enacted a constitutional amendment that shielded state liquor
regulations from the dormant Commerce Clause in a way legislation
never could. Justice Brandeis (who first interpreted the amendment a
mere three years after its ratification) recognized the amendment as
having achieved this goal.3 35 Likewise, Justice Black (who participated
in the Senate debates on the Twenty-First Amendment) regarded the
amendment's purpose as patently clear. 33 6 Rather than risk trampling
an express textual provision of the Constitution with a judicial inference, the Court should err on the side of caution and deem directshipment laws valid.
This need to proceed cautiously should hold true for the dormant Commerce Clause's champions and critics alike. For the doctrine to maintain its legitimacy, there can be no doubt that Congress
retains its commerce power over alcohol regulation, albeit in a "dormant" state. When the Court invokes the dormant Commerce Clause
in an area where Congress has ceded its commerce power to the
states, the doctrine's credibility becomes attenuated at best. A doctrine ofjudicial interventionbegins to look more like a doctrine ofjudicial activism. Thus, those who regard the dormant Commerce Clause
as valid should stay their hands when it comes to liquor regulations
like direct-shipment laws.
Furthermore, the Twenty-First Amendment gives those who reject
the dormant Commerce Clause even more reason to do so in the direct-shipment context. Regarding the doctrine as a textless vehicle for
judicial activism, these critics should have no problem exercising judi337
cial restraint. In Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co.,
Justice Black argued in dissent that "[i]t seems a trifle odd to hold that
an Amendment adopted in 1933 in specific terms to meet a specific
twentieth-century problem must yield to [the Export-Import Clause,]
a provision written in 1787 to meet a more general, although no less
334
335
336

See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.

337

377 U.S. 341 (1964).
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important, problem. '33 8 Similarly, critics of the dormant Commerce
Clause can argue that it seems outright absurd that the Twenty-First
Amendment must yield to a judge-made doctrine that was never "written" anywhere in the Constitution. Moreover, those who regard the
dormant Commerce Clause as a disruption of the Framers' intended
federalist system should have even greater reservations about the doctrine's impact on liquor regulation-an area of commerce the
Twenty-First Amendment turned over to state control.
C.

The Incredible Shrinking Twenty-First Amendment

The Twenty-First Amendment constitutes perhaps the most endangered piece of the Court's jurisprudential patchwork. Young's
Market acknowledged the amendment as having freed states of the
dormant Commerce Clause's strictures. Bacchus, however, reduced
the amendment to a mere last-ditch provision, which comes into play
only after the courts conduct a strict scrutiny dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. In two major respects, direct-shipment laws present
the Twenty-First Amendment with a make-or-break proposition.
First, direct-shipment laws strike at the heart of the Twenty-First
Amendment's text. Assuming, arguendo, that the amendment's text
is ambiguous, one thing remains certain: the phrases "central purposes" and "clear concerns" appear nowhere in Section 2. Moreover,
the amendment never provides a special distinction between discriminatory and nondiscriminatory liquor regulations. Rather, the amendment plainly proscribes the importation of wine into any state, "for
delivery or use therein," in violation of a state's direct-shipment
laws.33 9 As Justice Brandeis quipped in Young's Market, to say otherwise "would involve not a construction of the amendment, but a rewriting of it."340 The Court essentially rewrote the amendment with
Bacchus and should now seize upon direct-shipment laws as an opportunity to restore the provision to its original purpose.
Second, if the Court strikes down direct-shipment laws, it truly
will have come full circle. In Rhodes, the Court frustrated state attempts to regulate mail-ordered direct shipments from out-of-state liquor producers to in-state consumers. Congress responded with the
Webb-Kenyon Act and, subsequently, united with the states to free liquor from the dormant Commerce Clause's grip via the Twenty-First
Amendment. Needless to say, the technology has changed over the
years: out-of-state wineries now accept Internet orders via DSL connec338

Id. at 348 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936).

339 U.S.
340
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tions instead of mail orders via Pony Express. Yet, the concept of liquor's constitutionally divested character remains the same. Rather
than continue back down the road to Rhodes, the Court should readopt the deference it showed to the states shortly after the TwentyFirst Amendment's enactment.
CONCLUSION

Thomas Jefferson, the man who spent over fifty years unsuccessfully trying to establish his own vineyard at Monticello, 34 1 would un3 42
doubtedly toast the recent exponential growth of small wineries.
Even more to the point, he would probably hope the ongoing boom
in wine sales signals that the nation's attitude toward wine has
changed to the point where direct-shipment laws will soon become yet
another curious remnant of America's temperance-laden past.
Yet it seems equally plausible that a staunch states' rights proponent like Jefferson 3 43 would favor letting the states determine when
and how wine should once again flow directly to the homes of oenophiles. If direct-shipment laws have outlived their usefulness, each
state can certainly amend its own laws to accommodate this cultural
transformation. 344 Alternatively, perhaps Section 2 of the Twenty-First
Amendment-like its predecessor the Eighteenth Amendmentshould even be repealed. If so, Congress and the states can play their
constitutionally prescribed role in bringing about such an
amendment.

345

Either way, the amendment's fate should rest in the hands of legislators, not in those of the unelected judiciary. When the Court established its two-prong test in Bacchus, it essentially declared itself
better suited to determine the nation's alcohol policy than the states
341 PINNEY, supra note 2, at 129 (noting that between 1771 and 1822, Jefferson
made numerous unsuccessful attempts to establish his own vineyard in Monticello by
planting various native and imported vines).
342 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
343 For example, Jefferson boldly asserted in the Kentucky Resolutions "that the
several States composing the United States of America, are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general government." STATES' RIGHTS, supra
note 29, at 81. Rather, Jefferson argued, each state possesses "the residuary mass of
right to [its] own self-government." Id. Given that the Twenty-First Amendment constitutes one of the Constitution's few express grants of power to the states, Jefferson's
antifederalist leanings may have ultimately outweighed his oenophilia.
344 See also Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 239 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Changes in
marketing techniques or national consumer demand for a product do not alter the
meaning of a constitutional amendment. If New York wishes to further relax its regulatory control of the flow of wine into New York, it can do so.").
345 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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and Congress. This display of judicial activism calls into question the
Court's federalism and dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Rather than risk further undermining these two doctrines-let alone
the Twenty-First Amendment-the Court should scrap its current jurisprudential patchwork of "old wineskins" and re-stitch a container
capable of accommodating the "new wine" of direct-shipment laws.
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